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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
When Can We Trust Our Memories? 
Quantitative and Qualitative Indicators of Recognition Accuracy 
by 
Kurt Andrew DeSoto 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015 
Professor Henry L. Roediger, III, Chair 
In this dissertation, I present a quartet of experiments that studied confidence ratings and 
remember/know/guess judgments as indicators of recognition accuracy. The goal of these 
experiments was to examine the validity of these quantitative and qualitative measures of 
metacognitive monitoring and to interpret them using the continuous dual-process model of 
signal detection (Wixted & Mickes, 2010).  
In Experiment 1, subjects heard or read items belonging to categorized lists and took an old/new 
recognition test over studied and new items while making remember/know/guess judgments after 
each recognition decision. Consistent with prior literature, remember judgments were more 
likely to be accurate than know judgments, and knows more accurate than guesses. Subjects were 
more likely to commit remember false alarms to nonstudied category members of higher 
response frequency for a category (e.g., eagle) than to items of lower response frequency (e.g., 
ostrich), although the overall proportion of false remembering was lower than the proportion 
often found using associative false memory procedures (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995). 
Presentation modality did not affect recognition performance. 
 xiv 
In Experiment 2, subjects provided both confidence ratings and remember/know/guess judgments 
following recognition decisions in an otherwise similar procedure. Overall, accuracy correlated 
with both confidence and remember/know/guess judgment, and remembered memories rated 
with high confidence were more accurate than either high confidence or remembered memories 
alone. These results suggested that confident retrieval of episodic and contextual information 
supported accurate recognition decisions. I also calculated confidence-accuracy correlations 
using four methods and found that confidence and accuracy were correlated for remembered and 
known memories, but that no correlation was found for guesses. 
In Experiment 3, subjects studied category items in different screen positions (instead of in the 
center of the screen, as in the prior experiments). On the recognition test following, subjects were 
tested on whether items presented were old or new and also reported the screen position in which 
items were presented (i.e., a test of source memory). Confidence ratings followed these 
recognition + source decisions. A similar relationship was found between confidence ratings and 
remember/know/guess judgments when predicting both old/new recognition accuracy and source 
accuracy. This result contradicts predictions made by the continuous dual-process model, which 
states that only remember judgments and not confidence ratings should indicate source accuracy. 
Experiment 4 was conducted to replicate and extend results of Experiment 3 and to examine the 
effects of the order of judgments provided during the test. In this experiment, subjects were 
asked to make old/new recognition decisions, old/new confidence ratings, source decisions, 
source confidence ratings, and remember/know/guess judgments, with test order counterbalanced 
among four between-subjects conditions. In this study, I found that the relationship between 
confidence and old/new and source accuracy as a function of remember/know/guess judgment 
 xv 
was similar regardless of condition, reproducing the observations of Experiment 3. These results 
were also inconsistent with predictions made by the continuous dual-process model and 
suggested that the results of Experiment 3 were not due to confounding effects of judgment 
order. 
Taken together, the results of these four experiments suggest that confidence and 
remember/know/guess judgments are valuable when used jointly and that both contribute 
individually as indicators of recognition accuracy. The results show that the continuous dual-
process model of signal detection is a helpful way to consider the interaction of confidence 
ratings and remember/know/guess judgments, but they also imply that additional research is 
necessary to evaluate how the present results fit with the model. In particular, Experiments 3 and 
4 failed to obtain Wixted and Mickes’ (2010) finding of higher source accuracy for remember 
responses than for knows and guesses regardless of level of confidence. 
The practical message is that researchers and rememberers should consider both quantitative and 
qualitative characteristics of a memory when attempting to infer its accuracy. 
  
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
A fundamental characteristic of our memories is our belief in them. When we look back at our 
lives and remember the people we have met, the skills we have learned, the events we have 
experienced, and the facts we have been taught, we usually have faith that what comes to mind is 
what truly occurred. Although we recognize that the quality of our memories varies – graduating 
from kindergarten may be hazy, whereas our first kiss leaves an imprint like a flashbulb – we 
assume that the details we are able to remember are correct. Our everyday lives function under 
the trust that this is so. 
1.1 Should We Trust Our Memories? 
Often, when we are confident in our memories, it turns out that they are correct. A long history 
of psychology research, however, reveals that our memories can sometimes lie to us, too. It turns 
out that the confidence with which we hold our memories can sometimes be misguided and have 
no bearing on truth. Even more concerning is that there are times when we are very confident in 
our memories of events that never happened. We are sometimes so certain of these memories, in 
fact, that we even believe we can remember specific details surrounding them – perhaps details 
of sound or color. Understanding these illusions of remembering, called false memories, and 
their relationship with the subjective experiences of the rememberer is the central topic of this 
dissertation.  
Psychological researchers have long known that memory’s reconstructive nature contributes to 
false memories. This area of research began with the work of Bartlett (1932) and continues today 
(see Roediger & DeSoto, 2015, for a review). The neuropsychologist Hebb (1949) likened the 
 2 
process of remembering to that of a paleontologist reconstructing a dinosaur – just like a 
paleontologist makes use of individual fossils to make an inference about the whole beast, 
humans have a tendency to embellish, extrapolate, and guess when remembering. Similarity and 
confusion can also play a role in false memories, too; sometimes we remember or recognize 
something that is like, but not quite the same as, something we have previously learned or 
experienced. In general, these processes of reconstruction and similarity matching work to the 
benefit of memory – we are normally more correct than not – but they also produce errors (see 
Roediger, 1996).  
The fallible nature of memory has been well documented in the scientific literature. Google 
Scholar estimates that since I began my graduate training in psychology in 2009, over 300 
articles have been published with the phrase “false memory” in the title and nearly 7,500 with it 
in the text. Despite this wealth of research, however, the general public appears relatively under-
informed about the existence and frequency of false memories. In a 2011 telephone survey study 
conducted by Simons and Chabris, 63% of a representative sample of the U.S. population agreed 
with the statement Human memory works like a video camera, accurately recording the events 
we see and hear so that we can review and inspect them later. Similarly, 48% of Americans 
agreed with the statement Once you have experienced an event and formed a memory of it, that 
memory does not change. In contrast, the disagreement of a group of psychologists who took the 
same survey was nearly unanimous.  
The lack of awareness of the reconstructive nature of memory has significant implications for 
domains such as education, medicine, business, and law. The case of Antonio Beaver is one 
example of these implications. Beaver, a St. Louis-area man, spent 10 years in prison as a result 
 3 
of a confident eyewitness misidentification. The Innocence Project, a group dedicated to 
assisting wrongfully convicted individuals, describes on its website how in 1996 a woman was 
carjacked by a man wielding a screwdriver. She escaped unharmed and helped police construct a 
composite sketch of her attacker. About a week later, police presented her with a live lineup of 
four people, yet only one in the lineup, Beaver, came close to matching the sketch. The victim 
said she was “90% sure” that Beaver was the perpetrator, and then changed to “100% sure” after 
investigating the lineup more closely (see Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger, 2014, 
for a discussion of how confidence ratings change over time). That confident identification was 
enough evidence for an 18-year prison sentence. Ten years into Beaver’s sentence, however, 
DNA testing of evidence found at the original crime scene identified another man, already in 
prison, as the actual attacker, and Beaver was released. In this case, the cost of a high confidence 
false memory was 10 years of a person’s life. Cases like these make it clear that there is a 
continued need to investigate confidence ratings and other indicators of memory accuracy. 
This dissertation presents a research program conducted with the primary goal of assessing how 
individuals can determine whether the memories they hold are likely to be accurate or inaccurate. 
First, I review the psychological variable of confidence, which can be considered a quantitative 
measure of memory, and describe research my colleagues and I and others have conducted on the 
relationship between confidence and accuracy. I then describe the remember/know/guess 
judgment, a method of investigating the qualitative nature of memories, and discuss recent 
research that has attempted to combine these two judgments. 
Next, I report four experiments carried out to further develop and extend knowledge of these 
quantitative and qualitative indicators of recognition accuracy. In Experiment 1, I applied the 
 4 
remember/know/guess procedure to a false memory procedure we have used in prior work 
(DeSoto & Roediger, 2014). I compared false memories arising in this procedure to false 
memories that arise in other procedures (e.g., the Deese-Roediger-McDermott procedure; DRM; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995), and also tested differences in responding as a function of the 
modality in which items were studied (e.g., visual vs. auditory). Experiment 2 was aimed at 
collecting both confidence ratings and remember/know/guess judgments in the same procedure 
and relating the results to a recent theoretical model of recognition memory (Wixted & Mickes, 
2010). In Experiments 3 and 4, I extended the previous procedures, testing individuals’ memory 
for both old/new recognition but also for source details (specifically, the location in which items 
were presented). To foreshadow, these four studies agreed in showing that both confidence 
ratings and remember/know/guess judgments are useful indicators of memory accuracy. The 
results also implied that the continuous dual-process model is useful for understanding the 
confidence-accuracy relationship, although certain aspects of the model were not verified. 
1.2 Confidence as an Indicator of Recognition Accuracy 
When individuals attempt to determine the accuracy of a memory, they engage in a process 
called memory monitoring (Nelson & Narens, 1990). Memory monitoring is a type of 
introspection that involves analytic considerations about the nature of memories retrieved as well 
as the application of heuristics and cues. In the psychology laboratory, the monitoring process is 
studied through the use of subjective reports: Subjects make a memory decision (e.g., “I believe I 
studied this item earlier in the experiment”), and then they answer one or more questions about 
that decision. 
One heuristic used in memory monitoring is subjective confidence, sometimes called certainty, 
 5 
which is defined as the subjective sense of sureness that a memory report is accurate (Dunlosky 
& Metcalfe, 2009). These self-intuitive ratings have a long history and continue to be employed 
in research studies today. 
1.2.1 A Brief History of Confidence Ratings 
Theorists have been interested in the topic of subjective confidence for millennia. Aristotle, as an 
example, examined the relation between confidence and human virtue. To him, consistent with 
his concept of the golden mean, confidence was undesirable in excess but was a notable quality 
when occurring in moderation. In one translation of his Rhetoric, Aristotle is attributed as saying, 
“When in danger at sea, people may feel confident about what will happen either because they 
have no experience of bad weather, or because their experience gives them the means of dealing 
with it” (Roberts, 1924/1984). 
Because there was no discipline called psychology in Aristotle’s time, however, the empirical 
study of confidence took more than 2,000 years to develop. It was not until the 1800s that the 
study of confidence ratings came into the mainstream thanks to the work of psychophysics 
researchers. One of the earliest papers in the confidence literature is an 1885 monograph written 
by Peirce and Jastrow. In this research, coincidentally published in the same year as 
Ebbinghaus’s (1885/1913) landmark work on memory, subjects estimated the magnitude of 
pressures placed upon their fingertips. After making an estimate, subjects were then asked to rate 
how high or low their confidence was on a numeric scale. Perhaps surprisingly, the way in which 
confidence ratings are collected has not much changed in 130 years. 
In contrast, scientific understanding and use of confidence has grown considerably. In the 
modern era, retrospective confidence ratings are commonly used in the areas of judgment and 
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decision-making (e.g., Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & 
Phillips, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) as well as by signal detection theorists (e.g., 
Lockhart & Murdock, 1970; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). Confidence ratings also are frequently 
employed within the psychological subfield of metacognition (e.g., Flavell, 1979; Hart, 1965; 
Nelson & Narens, 1990). Tulving and Madigan anticipated a renaissance of introspective 
techniques when they urged in their 1970 paper, “Why not start looking for ways of 
experimentally studying… one of the truly unique characteristics of human memory: its 
knowledge of its own knowledge” (p. 477). Fittingly, research conducted in this tradition has 
emphasized that the degree to which confidence is associated with accuracy is of great 
theoretical interest. This perspective is illustrated by Nelson and Narens (1990), who wrote, 
“Introspection can be examined as a type of behavior so as to characterize both its correlations 
with some objective behavior… and its distortions” (p. 128). 
We can apply Nelson and Narens’ (1990) suggestion to the issue of confidence as an indicator of 
memory accuracy. When is confidence related to accuracy? When is this relationship distorted? 
1.2.2 Different Relations Between Confidence and Accuracy 
Researchers have disagreed about the nature of the relationship between confidence and accuracy 
and the usefulness of confidence in real-world situations (e.g., eyewitness testimony scenarios). 
Cognitive psychologists have reported that confidence and accuracy generally are related – 
namely, that memory decisions made with higher confidence are more likely to be accurate than 
decisions made with lower confidence (see Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009, chs. 6, 8). In contrast, 
forensic psychologists often have argued that the association between confidence and accuracy is 
either weak or nonexistent (e.g., Odinot, Wolters, & van Koppen, 2008; V. L. Smith, Kassin, & 
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Ellsworth, 1989). In a 2012 review, however, we (Roediger, Wixted, & DeSoto) observed that 
the confidence-accuracy relationship is complex: One can analyze the same dataset in several 
different ways and arrive at divergent conclusions about the nature of this relationship. In this 
section, I discuss these differing accounts of the confidence-accuracy relation and how they can 
be resolved. 
Positive Confidence-Accuracy Relations 
Cognitive psychologists believe that confidence and accuracy are usually related. This 
assumption goes back quite a while: Over a century ago, Dallenbach (1913) observed, “The 
degree of certainty of [a subject’s] replies bears a direct relation to the fidelity of the answer” (p. 
335). In an experiment that led to this conclusion, Dallenbach gave subjects one minute to study 
a picture of a man and woman sitting at a table drinking tea. He then tested the subjects at 
different time intervals ranging from immediately to 45 days after the initial study session. The 
test contained a series of questions that each corresponded to a detail of the photo. After subjects 
answered a question, they indicated their confidence. Dallenbach found that when subjects were 
more confident when responding to a test question, they were less likely to produce an error (and 
thus were more likely to be correct). Put differently, confidence in this experiment was directly 
related to accuracy. 
One hundred years later, scholars continue to claim that confidence and accuracy are positively 
related. Dunlosky and Metcalfe (2009), in their excellent primer on metamemory, stated, “The 
relative accuracy of people’s confidence is high. Higher confidence ratings almost inevitably 
mean that [an] item had been previously presented” (p. 176). This perspective is borne from 
early research investigating tip-of-the-tongue states and feelings of knowing (Hart, 1967) and 
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strength-trace theories of memory (e.g., King, Zechmeister, & Shaughnessy, 1980). Dunlosky 
and Metcalfe’s dictum is also implicit in other theories of recognition memory, as suggested by 
Wixted and Mickes (2010) – who we will return to later – who said, “Memories are said to be 
strong when they are associated with relatively high confidence, high accuracy, and fast reaction 
times” (p. 1025). According to these researchers, confident memories are often accurate ones. 
Drawing on this scientific opinion, as well as on some degree of common sense, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided to accept confidence of eyewitness identifications as evidence in a court 
of law in Neil v. Biggers (1972), ruling, “The factors to be considered in evaluating the 
likelihood of misidentification include… the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation,” that is, the meeting of the witness and the suspect in court. In this landmark case, 
the Supreme Court decided that because “[the victim] testified…  that there was something about 
[the suspect’s] face ‘I don’t think I could ever forget… we find no substantial likelihood of 
misidentification.” 
In sum, many experimental psychologists and those in the justice system assume a strong 
relation between confidence and accuracy. 
Null Confidence-Accuracy Relations 
One hundred years of cognitive psychology research is directly contradicted, however, by a just-
as-lengthy investigation spearheaded by forensic psychologists who have been critical of the 
assumptions made by cognitive psychologists and the justice system. These researchers, who 
often study police lineups, eyewitness identification, and face recognition, have long stated that 
the relation between confidence and accuracy is actually quite poor. This theorizing dates back to 
the days of Münsterberg (1908), who wrote in his famous book On the Witness Stand: 
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In some Bowery wrangle, one witness was quite certain that a rowdy had taken a 
beer-mug and kept it in his fist while he beat with it the skull of his comrade; 
while others saw that the two were separated by a long table, and that the assailant 
used the mug as a missile, throwing it a distance of six or eight feet. 
This colorful quote illustrates the reconstructive nature of memory: Here, two individuals are 
quite confident that two different events occurred, and it is unlikely that both accounts are true 
(although admittedly more possible in this example than in others). Accordingly, Münsterberg’s 
subsequent case studies and empirical investigations, often conducted as classroom 
demonstrations, failed to find a relationship between confidence and accuracy. 
Modern research conducted by forensic and social psychologists has corroborated early theories 
about the weak confidence-accuracy relation. In many of the studies conducted in these 
traditions, subjects see a scene unfold before them in which a perpetrator commits a staged or 
real crime (as recorded by a security camera, etc.), wait a period of time, and then are asked to 
make an identification from a real or simulated lineup. Subjects rate their confidence following 
the identification, and it rarely corresponds with accuracy (for a critique of the statistic 
improperly used to calculate the confidence-accuracy relation in many of these studies, called the 
point-biserial correlation, see Juslin, Olsson, & Winman, 1996; Roediger et al., 2012).  
Results like these have led forensic researchers to make bold claims such as, “Common sense 
and the Supreme Court notwithstanding, confidence is not a useful indicator of the accuracy of a 
particular witness or of the accuracy of particular statements made by the same witness” (V. L. 
Smith et al., 1989, p. 358), and that confidence “should never be allowed as evidence in the 
courtroom” (Odinot et al., 2008, p. 513). Clearly, these opinions are different from the ones 
listed earlier, and these two sets of researchers might disagree on the validity of confidence 
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ratings in laboratory tasks, forensic contexts, and other real-life situations.  
Negative Confidence-Accuracy Correlations 
Sometimes, confidence is such a poor indicator of accuracy that it correlates negatively with 
accuracy. In these cases, the more confident an individual is, the less likely he or she is to be 
accurate. I will describe several of these cases in greater detail in upcoming sections.  
So, what is the relation between confidence and accuracy? The reports just described make it 
seem as if there is no general answer, or that the relations obtained depend on the materials that 
are used, the research tradition employed, or perhaps the scenario to which confidence ratings are 
being applied. Indeed, this question as worded is too broad to answer. Nevertheless, three lines 
of research have made good progress of understanding the characteristics that make confidence-
accuracy relations more lawful than they appear at first glance.   
1.2.3 Explanations of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation 
The seemingly contradictory literature suggests, at least initially, that there is no clear answer as 
to whether confidence and accuracy are strongly or weakly related. Nevertheless, several groups 
of researchers have been successful at exploring descriptors of the magnitude and direction of the 
confidence-accuracy relation. Three recent approaches to understanding differences in the 
confidence-accuracy relation are the self-consistency model of subjective confidence (Koriat, 
2012), the metamemory approach to confidence (Brewer & Sampaio, 2006; 2012; Brewer, 
Sampaio, & Barlow, 2005; Sampaio & Brewer, 2009), and our research using categorized list 
procedures (DeSoto & Roediger, 2014; Roediger & DeSoto, 2014a; Roediger & DeSoto, 2014c; 
Roediger et al., 2012). Although these three lines of work emerge from different motivations and 
employ different materials, they agree on a basic account of when confidence and accuracy are 
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related and when they are not. 
The Self-Consistency Model of Subjective Confidence 
The self-consistency model of subjective confidence and the related consensuality principle 
proposed by Koriat (2008, 2012) state that confidence is only sometimes related to accuracy. 
Koriat and his colleagues, over decades of rigorous investigation, observed that higher 
confidence is not always assigned to the memory response that is correct. Rather, confidence 
corresponds with the memory response that is most likely to be chosen among subjects (referred 
to by Koriat as the majority response or consensual response). When the consensual response is 
the correct one, then, confidence is usually positively related to accuracy. When the consensual 
response is the incorrect one, on the other hand, or when there is no consensual response, 
confidence is not related to accuracy. 
For example, if subjects study the word cardinal among a list of unrelated words and see 
cardinal on an easy recognition test (e.g., after a short delay), a correct response of “old” is more 
common than an incorrect response of “new.” When a response is consensual – that is, others 
agree – it also tends to be rated with higher confidence. Therefore, because “old” is the 
consensual response – cardinal is a consensually correct item – responses of “old” are also 
assigned higher confidence ratings than responses of “new.” Thus, a positive confidence-
accuracy correlation emerges for cardinal. Because many cognitive psychologists use 
straightforward materials in their research, that is, materials in which most items are 
consensually correct, these researchers often find that confidence and accuracy are related. 
In contrast, sometimes the consensual response in a memory procedure is the incorrect one, and a 
given item may be consensually wrong. For example, after seeing a minute of crime footage, if a 
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lineup is constructed that includes a lure face very similar to the perpetrator shown in the video 
and does not include the actual perpetrator, subjects may be more likely than not to identify the 
lure. In these cases, the incorrect response – the consensual one – is assigned higher confidence 
ratings, on average, than the nonconsensual (but correct) response, and a negative confidence-
accuracy correlation results. This negative correlation means that when people are more 
confident in their response, they are more likely to be committing a memory error. 
Koriat (2008) provided an empirical demonstration of the self-consistency model. He presented 
subjects with a wide range of general knowledge questions and collected confidence ratings after 
each response. Some of these questions were consensually correct, and some were consensually 
wrong. For example, the question What is the name of India’s ‘holy’ river? was a consensually 
correct question because most subjects were able to come up with an answer that was also the 
correct one (The Ganges). On the other hand, the question The island of Corsica belongs to what 
country? was classified as a consensually wrong question because subjects usually responded 
incorrectly (saying Italy instead of France). Other questions had no consensual response. Koriat 
calculated gamma correlations (one way of measuring the confidence-accuracy association, 
resulting in a statistic that ranges from -1.00 to 1.00 in the same way as the Pearson r) for the 
different types of question and found that gamma was positive for the consensually correct 
questions (γ = .47, indicating a positive association between confidence and accuracy), negative 
for the consensually wrong questions (γ = -.24), and null for questions without a consensual 
response (γ = .04). Across all items, gamma was also positive (γ = .24), but weaker than gamma 
for the consensually correct questions analyzed alone.    
Koriat’s (2012) model provides a unifying explanation for the contradictions described in the 
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preceding sections. When researchers conduct studies using materials for which correct answers 
are more common than errors, positive confidence-accuracy relations are obtained. In contrast, 
when researchers conduct studies using materials for which incorrect answers are more likely, 
weak or even negative confidence-accuracy relations can be shown (for recent research using 
this theory, see Koriat & Sorka, 2015). 
The Metamemory Approach to Confidence 
The metamemory approach to confidence, proposed by Brewer, Sampaio, and their colleagues 
(Brewer & Sampaio, 2006; 2012; Brewer et al., 2005; Sampaio & Brewer, 2009), provides a 
similar account to predict when confidence and accuracy will be related. In one study, Sampaio 
and Brewer (2009) had subjects study different sentences (e.g., The tornado picked up the elm 
tree) and then take a recognition test over studied and nonstudied sentences. Subjects were given 
instructions to only respond “old” if the sentence presented at test was exactly the same as the 
one that was studied – in other words, that responses should be based on literal, surface structure 
memory. Subjects made confidence ratings after each response. 
Sampaio and Brewer (2009) found that subjects were highly likely to recognize the studied 
sentences correctly on a final test. Subjects were also tested on another class of sentences, 
however, called deceptive sentences. These sentences were similar to the studied sentences, 
except that certain critical words or phrases were replaced with synonyms. When subjects saw 
these sentences on the test, they were likely to recognize them, even though they were never 
studied (i.e., were not the verbatim originals). (Note that these sentences were predicted to be 
deceptive a priori.) For example, if subjects studied the sentence The narcotics officer pushed the 
doorbell, they often recognized the sentence The narcotics officer rang the doorbell, even though 
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the latter sentence was never presented verbatim (and might not be accurate – for instance, in this 
example, the doorbell might have been broken). In this case, subjects made the pragmatic 
inference that pushing the doorbell caused it to ring. 
Brewer and colleagues analyzed the confidence-accuracy relationship for the nondeceptive and 
deceptive sentences separately and found a modest gamma correlation between confidence and 
accuracy for nondeceptive sentences (γ = .26), but a negative correlation for deceptive ones (γ = -
.44), similar to the pattern obtained by Koriat (2008). Similar findings were also obtained using 
recall tests (Brewer et al., 2005) and forced choice recognition tests (Brewer & Sampaio, 2006; 
Sampaio & Brewer, 2009). In 2012, Brewer and Sampaio conceptually replicated these results 
using tests of geographical knowledge, too (e.g., Is Windsor, Ontario south of Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin? – a puzzle left to the reader). 
These findings led Sampaio and Brewer (2009), like Koriat (2012), to hypothesize that the 
magnitude and direction of the confidence-accuracy relation is a function of the items studied 
and tested. Summing things up, they wrote: 
We believe that the accuracy of memory confidence judgments depends on the 
distribution of materials that has been experienced previously and on the makeup 
of the items being tested. Thus, with a list of nondeceptive items, one can have a 
strong positive relationship between confidence and accuracy. With a list 
including a mixture of deceptive and nondeceptive items, one can have no 
relationship between confidence and accuracy. With a list of only deceptive items, 
one can have a strong negative relation between confidence and accuracy. (p. 162) 
As should be clear, the metamemory approach and self-consistency model proposed by Koriat 
(2012) tell the same general story. Although the theoretical explanations of why some items are 
deceptive and some items are not differ, these two theories make similar claims about the 
confidence-accuracy relation. In short, when a test is made up of nondeceptive (or consensually 
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correct) items, the confidence-accuracy correlation is positive. When a test is made up of 
deceptive (or consensually wrong) items, the relation is weakly negative. When a test contains 
both nondeceptive and deceptive items, the confidence-accuracy relation tends to be modestly 
positive. 
A limitation of the self-consistency and metamemory accounts is that they do not provide causal 
accounts of the confidence-accuracy relation – rather, they provide a description of when 
confidence and accuracy do and do not correlate. Nevertheless, this general characterization is a 
helpful way to describe positive, null, and negative correlations.   
Other Confidence-Accuracy Inversions 
Other researchers have also found negative relationships between confidence and accuracy. In an 
early example, Tulving (1981) asked subjects to study a series of complex scenic pictures, such 
as a city skyline or a farm among fields. Subjects studied one half of each scenic image (either 
the left or the right half), which was termed A. On a subsequent two-alternative forced choice 
recognition test, subjects were shown the studied picture (A) and one of three possible lures. The 
lures were either (1) the nonstudied half of the studied picture displayed (called A’), (2) the 
nonstudied half of another studied picture (B’), or (3) half of a nonstudied picture (X). Subjects 
rated confidence after each decision. See Figure 1.1 for an illustration of these different item 
types. 
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Figure 1.1: A recreation of the item types used by Tulving (1981). Subjects studied a series of pictures 
(top), then at test, a target (A) was paired with one of three types of lure (A’, B’, or X; bottom). Subjects 
were told to choose the studied picture. 
Tulving (1981) found that subjects’ confidence was lowest when they were deciding between the 
highly similar pairs (A-A’). This is because when subjects were asked to discriminate between 
two highly similar, confusable pictures, subjects realized that the decision was tricky and 
adjusted their confidence ratings downward accordingly. It turned out that recognition 
performance was not lowest for these high similarity pairs, however – in fact, subjects were 
worse at identifying A when it was presented in an A-B’ pair. Because these items were not 
perceptually similar, however (only ecphorically similar, to use Tulving’s phrase), subjects did 
not reduce their confidence when responding. Thus, for A-A’ pairs, subjects had lower 
confidence and higher accuracy relative to A-B’ pairs, for which higher confidence and lower 
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accuracy followed. 
Chandler (1994) followed up on Tulving’s (1981) research with a paper comprising a whopping 
14 experiments. In these experiments, subjects studied one third of each of a series of scenic 
pictures (e.g., A1). Following study, but before a final test, subjects were asked to make 
pleasantness ratings (or complete other orienting tasks) for a series of pictures, some of which 
were a nonstudied third of (and thus were highly similar to) a studied picture (e.g., A2). On a 
subsequent two-alternative forced choice recognition test, subjects saw a studied picture (A1) and 
the last third of the picture (A3), made a two-alternative forced choice recognition judgment, and 
then rated confidence. Across these experiments, Chandler showed that when subjects were 
required to discriminate between a studied picture and lure (A1- A3 pair) when a similar picture 
(A2) had been seen in the intermediate phase, confidence was increased but accuracy was lower 
relative to when subjects made the same judgment without having seen a similar image in the 
intermediate phase. Chandler theorized that seeing a related picture in an intermediate step (A2) 
increased familiarity for the general theme of the scene, which in turn increased confidence for 
pictures related to that scene. Seeing a related picture did not improve memory for the details of 
the originally presented picture (i.e., the target), however, and may have even interfered with the 
already-encoded details. Thus, the presentation of a related picture reduced or did not affect 
accuracy at test. 
In 1998, Dobbins, Kroll, and Liu repeated the Tulving (1981) procedure, but also asked subjects 
to make remember/familiar judgments (conceptually related to remember/know judgments, 
which will be discussed in detail later) along with confidence ratings after each test trial. The 
researchers replicated Tulving’s findings, but found that when subjects were remembering, 
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accuracy for A-A’ pairs was higher than accuracy for A-B’ pairs. When subjects were knowing, 
however, there was no difference in accuracy between these two types of pairs. Moreover, when 
subjects were remembering, there were no differences in confidence in responses for A-A’ and A-
B’ pairs, but when they were knowing, confidence for A-B’ pairs was greater than A-A’ pairs. 
These results suggested that the occurrence of remembering indicated that subjects were able to 
cut through the perceptual similarity of an A-A’ pair to arrive at the correct answer, and that 
subjects engaged in the confidence downshifting observed by Tulving mainly when knowing. 
Dobbins and colleagues concluded that these dissociations supported the idea of separate 
recollection and familiarity dimensions, but also indicated that the presence of recollection in and 
of itself is not always indicative of accuracy (especially for the A-B’ pairs). The implication is 
that both confidence and remember/know judgments are useful dimensions through which a 
memory can be evaluated – a central concept for the remainder of this dissertation. 
1.3 False Recall and Recognition of Category Members 
We have conducted several studies investigating the relationship between confidence and 
accuracy that draw on the theories previously mentioned (DeSoto & Roediger, 2014; Roediger & 
DeSoto, 2014a; Roediger & DeSoto, 2014c). Instead of using general knowledge questions or 
sentences, however, we used lists of words belonging to semantic categories and showed that 
positive, negative, and null relations between confidence and accuracy can be obtained using the 
same set of materials. Before reviewing this research, I provide a short review of the use of 
categorized lists to study false memories. 
1.3.1 Categorized Lists in the Literature 
The self-consistency model of subjective confidence and the metamemory approach to 
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confidence imply that the materials matter when it comes to investigating the confidence-
accuracy relationship. Koriat (2008) stressed this perspective when he said: 
[My] results highlight the theoretical benefits that ensue from a deliberate 
inclusion of nonrepresentative items (see Roediger, 1996). It is this inclusion that 
allows dissociating the effects of correctness from those of consensuality, thus 
providing some clues into the mechanism underlying the successful monitoring of 
one’s own performance.” (p. 954) 
As previously suggested, however, basic list-learning procedures used in the cognitive laboratory 
tend to be mostly straightforward, whereas forensic and social psychology procedures are often 
deceptive or tricky for subjects. Studying positive and negative confidence-accuracy correlations 
in the laboratory requires a compromise – a procedure that elicits sufficient numbers of both true 
and false memories (i.e., offers both nondeceptive and deceptive items at test). 
Fortunately, cognitive psychologists have several procedures in their toolkit that meet this 
requirement, including the Deese-Roediger-McDermott procedure (DRM procedure; Deese, 
1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), which celebrates its 20th anniversary this year. In the 
DRM procedure, subjects study items that are related associatively to a critical word that is never 
presented. Subjects usually recall or recognize the studied items on a subsequent recall or 
recognition test correctly. In many cases, however, subjects also intrude or falsely recognize the 
critical word, even though it was never studied. Experiment 1 of Roediger and McDermott’s 
study showed that subjects were often confident when remembering the critical word, and 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that, surprisingly, subjects could remember contextual details about 
the moment in which the critical word was presented – although this moment never actually 
occurred. Although the DRM procedure results in both true and false memories, the number of 
false memory observations available is relatively low, with only one possible per list in the 
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standard version of the procedure. This makes the DRM procedure less effective at exploring the 
confidence-accuracy correlation (although see Roediger & DeSoto, 2014c, for a reanalysis of the 
original DRM data that shows a confidence-accuracy inversion for critical lures).  
False memory has been investigated with materials other than associative (e.g., DRM-type) lists, 
however. The use of categorized lists is also popular in false memory research and is possibly 
more effective at studying the confidence-accuracy relation. In procedures using categorized 
materials, instead of studying words that are related associatively, subjects study items belonging 
to different semantic categories. For example, a subject may study a series of birds (e.g., 
cardinal, eagle, oriole, and bluejay) and attempt to remember them later. Researchers have 
observed in a variety of cases that category members that were never studied are sometimes 
recalled or recognized on a later test, much like how critical lures are remembered in the DRM 
procedure (although the nature of these false memories differ, and will be discussed later). 
Categorized lists are unique due to the way they are structured. Researchers compiling 
categorized list norms (i.e., material sets; e.g., Battig & Montague, 1969) ask subjects to name as 
many members of different categories as possible. Once these data have been collected, 
researchers rank-order each category item by the frequency with which it was provided by 
subjects. For example, in the Birds list, eagle is the bird mentioned most commonly by subjects, 
whereas raven is in the 20th position (usually items that are provided extremely infrequently are 
included in the norms but not ranked). List position in norming studies is referred to as response 
frequency rank or sometimes output dominance; therefore, items that subjects frequently produce 
are said to be high in response frequency, whereas items produced infrequently are low in 
response frequency. This means that the position of an item in a categorized list is a meaningful 
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value. In contrast, the order of items in the DRM procedure is less meaningful (although often 
items in these lists are presented in order of associative strength to the critical word). 
Like the critical items in DRM, category items that are high in response frequency are recalled or 
recognized even when they are never presented. Meade and Roediger (2006, 2009) had subjects 
study lists of category items with the top five items in terms of response frequency removed. In 
one experiment, several tests followed this study phase. First, subjects took a category cued 
recall test in which they were asked to name as many studied items as possible from provided 
categories. There were frequent intrusions of high response frequency items. Next, subjects took 
a free recall test in which they were also asked to provide remember/know judgments (Rajaram, 
1993; Tulving, 1985). There were additional intrusions of high response frequency items; 
moreover, subjects indicated (by providing remember judgments) that they had access to 
contextual and episodic details about the presentation of some items that were never studied 
(although know responses, indicating familiarity in the absence of recollection, were provided 
most often). In another experiment, Meade and Roediger also collected confidence ratings and 
found that high confidence was often associated with intrusions of high response frequency 
items. 
Dewhurst and colleagues (2001; Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999; Dewhurst & Farrand, 2004; 
Dewhurst, Bould, Knott, & Thorley, 2009) also investigated memory for category items. In one 
study (Dewhurst, 2001), subjects studied items of varying response frequency from different 
categories. On a subsequent recognition test, subjects were tested on words they had studied as 
well as lure items both higher and lower in response frequency than the studied items. Dewhurst 
observed that subjects were much more likely to commit a false alarm to lures of high response 
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frequency than low response frequency. In a later study, Dewhurst and Farrand (2004) conducted 
a similar experiment but asked subjects to provide introspective reports when responding to 
items on the test. The language associated with false alarms to high response frequency category 
items hinted that at encoding, some subjects covertly generated category items related to the ones 
that were studied. This observation led Dewhurst to propose a generation mechanism as an 
explanation for false alarms to category items. According to Dewhurst, when subjects study 
category items, they covertly generate related category members, and are more likely to generate 
items higher in response frequency than lower. On a final test, source monitoring errors are 
likely to occur in which subjects confuse the words they actually studied with the ones they 
generated. This results in an increased number of false alarms, especially for lures high in 
response frequency. 
S. M. Smith and colleagues (S. M. Smith, Gerkens, Pierce, & Choi, 2002; S. M. Smith, Tindell, 
Pierce, Gilliland, & Gerkens, 2001; S. M. Smith, Ward, Tindell, Sifonis, & Wilkenfeld, 2000) 
also conducted research using categorized lists. In the paper by S. M. Smith and colleagues 
(2000), subjects studied categorized lists with the first item removed. Subjects were given a 
recall test either after each list or after all the lists had been learned. When a test was given 
immediately after a list’s presentation, intrusions were infrequent; however, after all lists had 
been learned, intrusion likelihood increased considerably. Experiment 2 took a finer-grained 
approach. S. M. Smith and colleagues (2000) noted, “The use of categorized study lists makes 
it… possible to systematically observe the effects of gradations in the strength of items from the 
category rather than limiting the focus to the single most dominant one” (p. 389). With this in 
mind, they had subjects study either the even or the odd items from normed categorized lists and 
afterwards had subjects recall as many items as possible. They then examined the correlations 
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between an item’s response frequency and the likelihood that it was recalled correctly or intruded 
at test. 
S. M. Smith and colleagues (2000) observed that response frequency was a significant predictor 
of both correct recall and intrusions. Namely, after studying category items, subjects were more 
likely to correctly recall and intrude items that were higher in response frequency than lower. 
Other analyses conducted showed that these relationships were driven by response frequency 
even when accounting for things like typicality (i.e., the degree to which an item is prototypical 
of a given family). Analyses I conducted several years ago (DeSoto, 2011) also showed that 
response frequency has an effect on the likelihood of intrusions above and beyond the effects of 
word frequency, as well. S. M. Smith and colleagues hypothesized that items high in response 
frequency were high in accessibility and familiarity, and that these characteristics led to the 
increased number of both true and false memories. 
In sum, research conducted using categorized lists reveals the flexibility and utility of these 
materials. Although the false memories they evoke are not as strong or as compelling as those 
produced by associative lists, they are effective materials with which the relationship between 
confidence and accuracy can be explored. 
1.3.2 Prior Research: False Recognition of Category Members 
We have built upon the research of Dewhurst, S. M. Smith, and their colleagues to develop an 
updated categorized list procedure that is an effective tool to study confidence-accuracy relations 
in the laboratory. This tool has also helped to address the issue of positive, null, and negative 
correlations often found between confidence and accuracy. 
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In our first experiment on the topic (Roediger & DeSoto, 2014a), we were interested primarily in 
seeing if positive, negative, and null correlations between confidence and accuracy could be 
obtained using a single set of items. As mentioned previously, doing so required some items at 
test that were likely to be nondeceptive and some that were likely to be deceptive. With this aim, 
we presented subjects with 150 items taken from items 6-20 in the category norms belonging to 
10 categorized lists (i.e., in a fashion similar to Meade & Roediger, 2006; 2009). Thus, these 
items were neither high in response frequency (e.g., carrot) for a given category (e.g., A 
Vegetable), nor low in response frequency (e.g., artichoke) – so they were words like pea, 
cabbage, and pepper. The words were presented over headphones by category in random order. 
After a five-minute distractor task, subjects were given a 300-item recognition test composed of 
the 150 targets, 50 strongly related lures (items 1-5 from the 10 lists), 50 weakly related lures 
(items 21-25 from the lists), and 50 unrelated lures taken from nonstudied categories. Subjects 
responded “old” or “new” to the word on the screen, then rated their confidence in that decision 
on a scale from 0 (not at all confident) to 100 (entirely confident). 
Subjects were highly likely to recognize items 1-5 on the recognition test, even though they were 
not presented, replicating the results of Meade and Roediger (2006, 2009). When subjects 
committed false alarms to these items, they did so with disproportionately high confidence – a 
rating of 68, on average, on the 100-point scale (meanwhile, actual targets were identified with 
an average of 84 confidence). 
We analyzed the correlation between confidence and accuracy in a number of different ways, to 
be described in a later section, and observed a modest correlation between confidence and 
accuracy across methods of analysis. When we broke down these analyses by item type, 
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however, we discovered two distinct patterns, illustrated in the two panels of Figure 1.2. The 
correlation between confidence and accuracy was positive for targets (the nondeceptive items), 
as shown in the top panel, but for strongly related lures, those of response frequency 1-5, there 
was a striking negative relation between confidence and accuracy when using items as the unit of 
analysis (shown in the top panel). This meant that subjects were likely to identify these items as 
studied – even though they never were – and that subjects also provided higher confidence 
ratings when they said “old” to these items rather than “new.” Put differently, the items that 
subjects were more likely to commit false alarms to were also rated with higher confidence, on 
average. These findings agreed with expectations generated from the self-consistency model 
(Koriat, 2012) and the metamemory approach (Brewer & Sampaio, 2012). Moreover, the 
patterns were consistent with both the cognitive and forensic literatures – that is, they 
demonstrated simultaneous positive, negative, and null correlations between confidence and 
accuracy. 
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Figure 1.2: The between-events confidence-accuracy correlations for targets (top panel) and strongly 
related lures (lures of response frequency 1-5; bottom panel) in Experiments 1 and 2 of Roediger and 
DeSoto (2014a). Each point represents an individual item. 
This experiment demonstrated that different correlations between confidence and accuracy are 
possible as a function of the way analyses are conducted. We concluded that the similarity of the 
strongly related lures to the items that were studied drove the high false alarm rates and 
confidence ratings for these items. 
In follow-up analyses, we (Roediger & DeSoto, 2014a) observed that the false alarm 
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probabilities for items 1-5 appeared to follow a roughly linear pattern, with false alarms to items 
of response frequency 1 more frequent than those of response frequency 2, and so on (r = -.23). 
This hint of a pattern led us to design a revised categorized list procedure that enabled us to 
explore false alarm rates and their relationship with response frequency with greater power. This 
categorized list procedure was used in the four experiments reported in this dissertation.  
1.3.3 Prior Research: A Revised Categorized List Procedure 
In this revised categorized list procedure (DeSoto & Roediger, 2014), instead of studying items 
of intermediate response frequency taken from the middle of categorized lists, subjects studied 
either the even or the odd-ranked items (in terms of response frequency rank) from each list, 
following the same general procedure as described above (and similar to S. M. Smith et al., 
2000). In Experiment 1 of DeSoto and Roediger (2014), we used 12 lists containing 20 items 
each, meaning that each subject studied 120 items total (10 odd or 10 even items from each of 
the 12 categories). After a short distractor task, subjects took a recognition test over 360 items: 
the 120 targets, 120 related lures (the even items if subjects studied the odds, and vice versa), and 
120 unrelated lures from a number of other categories. Subjects made old/new recognition 
decisions and rated their confidence on a 0-100 scale. 
Our general findings were consistent with our earlier paper (Roediger & DeSoto, 2014a): False 
alarms to items from studied categories were common. Because we could calculate hit and false 
alarm probabilities for each response frequency position (1-20), unlike in the previous 
experiments, we were able to examine the relationship between response frequency and hit and 
false alarm rates. We discovered that there was not much effect of response frequency on hit rate, 
but there was a striking influence of response frequency on the false alarm rate: Subjects were 
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much more likely to commit false alarms to items of higher response frequency than lower 
response frequency, as confirmed by a strong negative correlation between the two variables (r = 
-.90). 
The confidence data showed a similar pattern: Subjects were more confident in their false alarms 
to higher response frequency category members than in their false alarms to lower ones. 
Additionally, when subjects committed a false alarm to a related lure, they rated it with higher 
confidence than they did when they correctly rejected a related lure. These findings, taken 
together, depict a double jeopardy situation for the related lures: Not only were subjects more 
likely to commit false alarms to higher response frequency items, but they also did so with 
higher confidence. Using the terminology of Brewer and Koriat, these high response frequency 
items were deceptive, and also consensually wrong (at least in terms of confidence, if not false 
alarm proportion). 
We also calculated confidence-accuracy correlations in a number of different ways, and like the 
results to the earlier experiments (Roediger & DeSoto, 2014a), a modest positive confidence-
accuracy correlation for all items hid two different underlying correlations, illustrated by Figure 
1.3. The relation between confidence and accuracy for targets was strongly positive, whereas the 
relation between confidence and accuracy for related lures was, according to one type of 
analysis, negative. These findings replicated our earlier results and supported the idea that when 
similar, related, or deceptive items are analyzed separately, confidence-accuracy dissociations 
emerge. 
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Figure 1.3: Between-events confidence-accuracy correlations for the same 240 category items when they 
were studied (targets; top panel) and nonstudied (related lures; bottom panel) in Experiment 1 of DeSoto 
and Roediger (2014). Each point represents an individual item. 
1.3.4 Summarizing the Confidence-Accuracy Relation 
The previous discussion and examples illustrate that confidence is, in general (i.e., across all 
items), a reasonably valid predictor of accuracy. Still, confidence is imperfect when it comes to 
certain cases where inferences are drawn, items seem deceptively fluent, or similarity problems 
arise (see Roediger & DeSoto, 2014c). We offered an explanation of the imperfect relation 
between confidence and accuracy when we wrote (DeSoto & Roediger, 2014): 
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Confidence-accuracy inversions will occur when information cued by lures on a 
recognition test overlaps considerably with the information about events stored in 
memory … matching is indicative of a correct retrieval, so people rely on the 
degree of match as indication of both correctness and confidence. False memories 
arise in part when lures resemble target events either perceptually or conceptually, 
and thus the match between cue and trace information signals that the event has 
been experienced previously when it has not. (p. 786) 
In sum, confidence is a generally valid indicator of accuracy in many situations, but in certain 
conditions when similarity between studied items and lures is high (i.e., when the studied item-
lure overlap is great), high confidence false alarms can occur. Is there a measure of memory 
monitoring that is less susceptible to these effects of similarity? The next section discusses a 
candidate for consideration. 
1.4 The Remember/Know/Guess Judgment as an Indicator of 
Recognition Accuracy 
Taken together, the results of Koriat (2012), Brewer and Sampaio (2012), DeSoto and Roediger 
(2014), and related studies establish that the confidence-accuracy correlation is positive when a 
recognition test contains nondeceptive or consensually correct items, or when an analysis is 
conducted on a type of nondeceptive item. Such materials may be straightforward sentences, 
easy general knowledge questions, or unrelated (or otherwise nondeceptive) word lists. Likewise, 
the confidence-accuracy correlation is negative when the test (or analysis) is over deceptive or 
consensually wrong items, such as deceptive sentences, misleading general knowledge questions, 
or highly similar lures. Tests or analyses conducted over items that do not have a consensual 
response or over deceptive and nondeceptive items mixed together results in a weak or null 
confidence-accuracy correlation. 
Unfortunately for the subject participating in an experiment, or the witness selecting a suspect 
 31 
from a police lineup, it is difficult to discern the deceptiveness of an item on a test or the overall 
composition of a test list. Without knowing this information, then, it is difficult or even 
impossible for a rememberer to know whether confidence is likely to be valid. Therefore, it is of 
theoretical and applied interest to examine other ways through which subjects might determine 
whether they should trust their confidence in a particular memory – or, in a sense, trust the 
persuasive yet subjective experience of a perceptual or conceptual match. 
We (DeSoto & Roediger, 2014) believe that this match between studied items and items on a test 
gives rise to confidence ratings. Because confidence ratings are reported using a continuous 
numerical scale, they can be considered to be a quantitative report of the strength of evidence (or 
degree of match) experienced during recognition. Importantly, however, memories differ in ways 
that are not only quantitative but qualitative, too. This difference is a core premise of dual-
process theories of memory (Jacoby, 1991; Tulving, 1985) and other aspects of cognition (e.g., 
Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996). According to dual-process memory theorists, remembering can 
be supported by familiarity, a bottom-up process stemming from perceptual or conceptual 
fluency, or by recollection, a top-down process requiring the use of cognitive control and 
indicating retrieval of contextual or episodic detail (see Yonelinas, 2002, for a review, and 
Craver, Kwan, Steindam, & Rosenbaum, 2014, for a recent neuropsychological perspective). 
These two processes are assumed to operate independently of one another. 
Confidence ratings are limiting, in this respect, because they do not reflect the separate 
contributions of recollection and familiarity experienced by the rememberer. If subjects have 
insight into whether they are remembering based on recollection or familiarity, perhaps they can 
judge the accuracy of their memories more effectively. 
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Experiment 3 of my master’s thesis (DeSoto, 2011) offered a hint that subjects can make use of 
qualitative bases of memory (i.e., recollection and familiarity) when responding to deceptive 
materials. In this experiment, subjects were presented with study or study-test repetitions of to-
be-learned category items. When subjects studied items, took a recognition test over them, and 
then studied them again, confidence-accuracy correlations were higher on a final test as 
compared to when subjects only studied the material once or twice. The second recognition test 
repetition was assumed to increase the amount of episodic information and source detail 
available to subjects at test (that is, it was assumed to increase recollection; see Benjamin, 2001). 
Additionally, the test repetition was also assumed to orient subjects to the composition of the test 
and deceptive quality of some lure items. 
Improved memory monitoring after the second test, as evidenced by the improved confidence-
accuracy correlations, suggested that an increase in recollective information available to subjects 
in the study-test repetition group reduced errors for items that were deceptive for subjects in 
other groups. As mentioned, however, this evidence was indirect; direct investigation of the 
qualitative nature of remembering requires the use of qualitative measures of memory 
monitoring instead of, or in addition to, quantitative measures (i.e., confidence ratings). 
1.4.1 The Remember/Know/Guess Procedure 
A measure of metacognitive monitoring that describes the qualitative nature of remembering – 
that is, one that describes contributions of recollection and familiarity to memory – was first 
proposed (although for a slightly different purpose) by Tulving (1985) and remains popular 
today: the remember/know procedure (see also Rajaram, 1993) and its variant, the 
remember/know/guess procedure (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Java, 1990; Gardiner, 
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Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998). In its most common version, subjects are asked to 
make a memory monitoring judgment each time they recognize an item on a recognition test 
(although the remember/know procedure can be used with other kinds of tests as well; e.g., 
McDermott, 2006; Mickes, Seale-Carlisle, & Wixted, 2013; Tulving, 1985). Subjects are 
instructed that if they can remember the episodic and contextual details of the moment a 
recognized item was presented, they should respond remember; otherwise, if the memory 
retrieved provides merely a general sense that the item was studied, they should respond know. 
Subjects respond guess when they are just guessing that an item is old. As initially conceived, 
remember/know judgments serve as an index of whether memories are episodic or semantic in 
nature, respectively (see Tulving, 1972); a more modern view, however, is that these judgments 
relate to multiple memory processes (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 2002). Specifically, 
remember judgments are thought to indicate the contribution of recollection to the recognition 
response, whereas know judgments signify familiarity (or perceptual or conceptual fluency) in 
the absence of recollection. (For an excellent review of dual-process theories, see the recent book 
edited by Lindsay, Kelley, Yonelinas, & Roediger, 2014, especially chapters by Dobbins, 2014, 
and Yonelinas, Goodrich, & Borders, 2014.) 
Following from these ideas, it is of interest to examine the degree to which remembering, 
knowing, and guessing are associated with the likelihood that a memory decision is correct. 
Similarly, it is also useful to investigate the interaction between recognition memory, confidence, 
and remembering, knowing, and guessing. In the case that items that are remembered are, on 
average, more likely to be accurate than items that are known, remembering can be taken as 
additional evidence of truth, and can be weighted as such. Moreover, if confidence for items that 
are remembered is more predictive of accuracy than confidence for items that are known, 
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someone who has subjective experience of remembering and is confident in his or her decision 
should be more comfortable trusting his or her confidence than someone who only has an 
experience of knowing. It is possible that if an individual can take into account both quantitative 
and qualitative variables when making a recognition decision – both confidence and subjective 
sense of remembering – memory monitoring could be improved. 
Very few researchers have collected confidence ratings and remember/know/guess judgments in 
the same experiment, however, so the relationship between the trio of memory accuracy, 
confidence, and remembering, knowing, and guessing is underexplored in the literature (although 
see Dobbins et al., 1998; Rotello & Zeng, 2008; Wixted & Mickes, 2010). The reason for this is 
that the general assumption historically has been that confidence and remember/know judgments 
measure the same construct (i.e., reflect two points on a continuum; a weak trace strength 
hypothesis; Gardiner & Java, 1990), so there is no reason to collect both measures (but see 
Rajaram, 1993, for an early rebuttal). Work by Wixted, Mickes, and colleagues (Ingram, Mickes, 
& Wixted, 2012; Mickes et al., 2013; Wixted & Mickes, 2010), however, provides recent 
evidence that confidence and remember/know/guess judgments are dissociable, meaning that 
remember and know judgments can both be made with either high or low confidence. The 
implication is that both confidence and remember/know/guess judgments bear on recognition 
accuracy. 
1.4.2 The Continuous Dual-Process Model of Remember/Know Judgments 
The continuous dual-process model of signal detection, proposed by Wixted and Mickes in 2010, 
is one recent attempt to synthesize remember/know/guess judgments with confidence ratings. 
According to this model, the strength of evidence a subject experiences when remembering 
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reflects a combination of both recollection (i.e., remembering) and familiarity (knowing). When 
this combination produces a high strength of evidence, the memory is likely to be true (i.e., is 
likely to have occurred), but when the combination produces little strength of evidence, the 
memory is probably false (i.e., nonexperienced). This combination of recollection and familiarity 
corresponds to, and is indexed by, the confidence ratings provided by a rememberer, such that 
high confidence is more likely to be associated with true memories, whereas low confidence is 
not. Put differently, old/new recognition is supported by a combination of recollection and 
familiarity, and confidence ratings are theorized to capture this combination.  
When a subject is asked to make a remember/know/guess judgment, however, he or she must 
untangle the recollection and familiarity experienced and assess each separately. First, the 
amount of recollection experienced is polled. According to the continuous dual-process model, 
recollection is assumed to be continuous, which means that all memories contain varying degrees 
of recollection (see also Slotnick, Jeye, & Dodson, 2014). This stance contrasts with other 
current theories of signal detection (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002), which establish that recollection is 
dichotomous (e.g., all-or-none). Thus, in order to assess recollection, the rememberer must 
compare the strength of recollection experienced to an internal decision criterion. If the strength 
of recollection exceeds this criterion, a remember response is provided. If the strength of 
recollection does not exceed the criterion, the rememberer next compares the strength of 
familiarity experienced to a second internal criterion. Familiarity is also assumed to be 
continuous (as it is in most models of signal detection). If familiarity exceeds this criterion, a 
know response is made. If not, a guess response is provided (see Figure 4 of Wixted & Mickes, 
2010, p. 1033, for a helpful illustration, which is reproduced as Figure 1.4 here). 
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Figure 1.4: A depiction of the Wixted and Mickes (2010) continuous dual-process model. Reprinted with 
permission from Wixted, J. T., & Mickes, L. (2010). A continuous dual-process model of 
remember/know judgments, Psychological Review, 117, 1025-1054. Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association.  
The basics of this model make straightforward predictions regarding the relationship between 
confidence and old/new recognition memory performance. Namely, old/new recognition 
memory is supported by a combination of remembering and knowing. Because confidence 
ratings index the recollection-familiarity combination, old/new recognition accuracy should thus 
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be correlated with confidence ratings, regardless of the degree to which remembering or knowing 
are influencing the confidence rating. On a test where episodic or source information is required 
for successful performance, however, such as a source memory test, only remembering should 
indicate accuracy, and confidence should play a reduced role. A simplified illustration of these 
predictions is found in Figure 1.5. 
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Figure 1.5: General predictions provided by the continuous dual-process model. 
To test the assumptions of the continuous dual-process model, Wixted and Mickes (2010) 
conducted a study in which subjects studied 128 unrelated words (from a pool of 256) that were 
presented at the top or bottom of the screen and in red or blue font. Following study, subjects 
took a test over the 128 targets and 128 lures. After making old/new recognition decisions, 
subjects rated their confidence and were asked to make remember/know/guess judgments for all 
items called “old.” After the remember/know/guess judgment, subjects indicated the screen 
position and presentation color of words thought to be old. 
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Wixted and Mickes (2010) found that confidence was related to old/new recognition accuracy 
for both remember and know judgments. Figure 1.6 summarizes the general pattern of findings 
(showing data from Ingram et al., 2012, but the overall pattern was similar in this study). 
Responses rated with higher confidence were more accurate, meaning that importantly, high 
confidence know responses were more likely to be accurate than lower confidence remember 
responses (see the filled points in panels A, B, and C). In contrast, remember responses predicted 
greater source memory performance than knows regardless of level of confidence (mostly seen in 
panel A), evidencing that remembering is a more important predictor of source accuracy than 
confidence. These results were taken as support that confidence ratings and 
remember/know/guess judgments index separate aspects of memory – strength and content, 
respectively.  
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Figure 1.6: The critical results of Ingram et al. (2012). Reprinted with permission from Ingram, K. M., 
Mickes, L., & Wixted, J. T. (2012). Recollection can be weak and familiarity can be strong. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38, 325-339. Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association. 
In a similar study, Ingram et al. (2012) also assessed the predictions of the continuous dual-
process model. In their Experiment 1, subjects studied 128 unrelated words, which were 
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presented at the top or bottom of the screen in red or blue font. Following the study phase, 
subjects took a recognition test over 256 words: 128 targets and 128 lures (also unrelated words). 
Subjects made a recognition decision and rated their confidence on an unusual scale (see Figure 
1.7) that ranged from 1 (100% sure new) to 20 (100% sure old). Each rating of 16, 17, 18, 19, or 
20, however, could be assigned either a F (representing a familiar, meaning know, response) or 
an R (representing a remember response), so two sets of numbers (16F to 20F, 16R to 20R) were 
shown on the screen. Ingram and colleagues did not use the dual scale for confidence ratings of 
10-15 because pilot studies showed subjects were unable to make the distinction between 
remember and familiar responses for these values. Thus, Ingram and colleagues’ unusual method 
captured a recognition decision, confidence, and a remember/know judgment all with one mouse 
click. 
Additionally, for all items that received an “old” judgment (i.e., were assigned a confidence 
rating of 10 or higher), subjects made a source memory decision, clicking to choose whether the 
word presented was in red or blue and at the top or bottom of the screen. 
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Figure 1.7: The response scale used by Ingram et al. (2012). Subjects made confidence ratings and 
remember/familiar judgments for each item at the same time. 
Ingram and colleagues (2012) confirmed the predictions made by the continuous dual-process 
model. First, they found that on average, items that received an R response were more likely to 
be higher in confidence and accuracy (accuracy = .93, confidence = 19.2) than items that 
received an F response (accuracy = .80, confidence = 18.5). This is a finding common to most 
studies. When confidence was controlled for by only examining maximum-confidence responses, 
however, old/new recognition accuracy was the same; in other words, subjects who responded 
with 20 confidence were equally likely to be correct regardless of whether a 20R (accuracy = 
.97) or 20F (accuracy = .95) was chosen (although perhaps a ceiling effect was in play here; see 
Figure 1.6, panels A and B). Source memory, however, was significantly greater for 20R 
responses (source accuracy = .82) than 20F (source accuracy = .58) responses (with chance = 
.50; see Figure 1.6, panels A and B). In a critical test of the continuous dual-process model, 
lower confidence R responses showed greater source accuracy than the maximum confidence K 
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responses (see Figure 1.6, panel A). Thus, these findings favor the continuous dual-process 
model and also contradict the notion of a single dimension (with low confidence and know 
responses on one end and high confidence and remember responses on the other). 
In conclusion, Wixted and Mickes (2010) and Ingram et al. (2012) showed the value of 
collecting confidence ratings and remember/know/guess judgments in the same procedure. The 
continuous dual-process model they proposed offers a potential theoretical foundation for the 
investigation of qualitative and quantitative indicators of recognition accuracy. One potential 
limitation of the research conducted on the continuous dual-process model thus far, however, is 
that the studies have been conducted using only unrelated word lists, meaning that they lack the 
“deliberate inclusion of nonrepresentative items” recommended by Koriat (2008, p. 954). Would 
the results of Wixted, Mickes, Ingram, and colleagues generalize beyond procedures using 
unrelated words? As stated earlier, the theoretical and practical implications of deceptive items 
are also important. It is unclear, and critical, whether the continuous dual-process model 
accurately describes the relationship between confidence, remember/know/guess, and accuracy 
when factors like similarity are at play, as they are in the DeSoto and Roediger (2014) 
categorized list procedure. Would using this procedure lead to similar results, even for deceptive 
materials?  
To address these concerns, I conducted a series of four experiments with the overarching goals 
of: (1) bridging a connection between confidence-accuracy studies using deceptive and 
nondeceptive materials with the continuous dual-process model, (2) assessing confidence ratings 
and remember/know/guess judgments, as well as the combination of these two ratings, as 
indicators of recognition accuracy, and (3) evaluating these findings in light of the continuous 
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dual-process model. Achieving these goals first required adapting the DeSoto and Roediger 
(2014) procedure to collect remember/know/guess judgments, which was necessary for further 
experiments.  
Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
In the DeSoto and Roediger (2014) paper, we characterized the patterns of confidence that arise 
when subjects study category items of varying response frequency and are tested on targets and 
lures that also vary in response frequency. I designed Experiment 1 of this dissertation to be a 
companion study to the DeSoto and Roediger experiments, investigating the qualitative nature of 
memories arising in the procedure (similar to the difference between Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 of Roediger & McDermott, 1995). To that end, in this experiment, I collected 
remember/know/guess judgments instead of confidence ratings; the eventual goal was to 
combine confidence ratings and remember/know/guess judgments into the same procedure. In 
Experiment 1, I also investigated the effects of presentation modality (audio vs. visual) on test 
performance, as explained below. 
Thus, Experiment 1 was aimed at answering answer three questions: (1) Was there an effect of 
presentation modality on responding (and false alarm proportion, specifically)? (2) What were 
the rates of remembering, knowing, and guessing in the experiment, and how did these differ as a 
function of response frequency? (3) What is the relation between remember/know/guess and 
accuracy in the categorized list procedure? 
In Experiment 1, I examined whether false alarms to category items are more or less common 
when the items are read versus heard during the study phase (i.e., presented via visual or auditory 
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modalities). Research using the DRM procedure has shown that when associative lists are heard 
at study, more false memories occur than when they are read at study, assuming the test is a 
visual one (see Gallo, McDermott, Percer, & Roediger, 2001; Kellogg, 2001; Pierce, Gallo, 
Weiss, & Schacter, 2005; R. E. Smith & Hunt, 1998). Little research has investigated the effects 
of presentation modality on false memories for categorized lists, however.  
To investigate this issue, I introduced a manipulation in which subjects were presented with 
categorized items via audio presentation (over headphones), as in previous experiments (e.g., 
DeSoto & Roediger, 2014; Roediger & DeSoto, 2014a), or visually (on a computer screen). In 
studies using the DRM procedure, it is assumed that false memories are reduced in visual study 
conditions because subjects are better at metacognitive monitoring following visual study than 
audio study (e.g., Gallo et al., 1998), and that subjects “use the lack of visual details to reject 
critical lures only when these lures were presented visually at test” (p. 351). There was no reason 
a priori to assume that the circumstances would be any different with categorized lists as 
compared to associative lists. Given the literature, then, I hypothesized that false alarms would 
occur more frequently when words were presented auditorily rather than visually. 
Aside from the theoretical purpose of this manipulation, a practical aim of testing modality 
effects was to determine whether the categorized list procedure was equally viable with both 
auditory and visual presentation. Testing source memory, which I did in Experiments 3 and 4, 
would be more straightforward if I could use a visual study phase instead of an auditory study 
phase. 
Experiment 1 was also aimed at investigating the rates of remembering, knowing, and guessing 
and the relationship between remember/know/guess judgments and recognition accuracy. 
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Research by Dewhurst (2001), described earlier, informed my expectations of the patterns of 
remembering, knowing, and guessing that would occur. Dewhurst, in his second experiment, also 
had subjects study category items of varying response frequency. Following study, subjects took 
a recognition test over targets and lures that were either high in response frequency, low in 
response frequency, or unrelated to any studied categories. Dewhurst found that category items 
produced both correct and false recognition. Targets generally received remember responses 
(around 47% of the time), whereas lures received a mixture of remember, know, and guess 
responses (about 12% of lures were assigned each judgment).  
Dewhurst (2001) examined remember/know/guess patterns as a function of response frequency 
and found that subjects made more correct remember responses (i.e., remember hits) to low 
frequency items than high frequency items, and more correct know responses to high frequency 
items than low frequency items. On the other hand, both incorrect remember and know responses 
(i.e., false alarms) were more common to high frequency lures than low frequency lures. These 
findings are reproduced in Table 2.1. 
Dewhurst theorized that these results emerged because subjects covertly generated associates to 
studied category members at encoding and committed source memory errors on the recognition 
test, misidentifying items generated during encoding as items that were actually studied. 
 46 
Table 2.1: Response rates in Dewhurst’s (2001) Experiment 2. 
Item Type Total “Old” Remember Know Guess 
High Frequency Targets .70 .44 .17 .08 
Low Frequency Targets .66 .51 .11 .04 
High Frequency Lures .36 .10 .14 .13 
Low Frequency Lures .12 .01 .07 .03 
Unrelated Lures .05 .00 .03 .02 
 
Although Dewhurst (2001) explored remember/know/guess rates for category items, the 
procedure he used did not permit him to examine response proportions over the wide range of 
response frequency values in the way that S. M. Smith et al. (2000) did (or as we did in DeSoto 
& Roediger, 2014). By applying remember/know/guess judgments to the DeSoto and Roediger 
(2014) procedure, I attempted to replicate Dewhurst (2001) with a wider range of response 
frequency values (i.e., items 1-20 from the norms).  
2.1 Method 
In Experiment 1, subjects studied items of varying response frequency taken from semantic 
categories. Half of subjects heard the words read over headphones, whereas the other half of 
subjects saw the words on a computer screen. Following study, subjects took a recognition test 
on three types of items: (1) studied items, (2) nonstudied items from studied categories, and (3) 
nonstudied items from nonstudied categories. For each item on the recognition test, subjects 
decided whether the item was old (i.e., studied) or new (i.e., nonstudied). Following each 
recognition decision of “old,” subjects made a remember/know/guess judgment for that item.  
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2.1.1 Subjects 
Sixty-four subjects from the Washington University in St. Louis psychology pool participated, 
including 23 men and 41 women (mean age = 19.45, SD = 1.55, min age = 18, max = 23). 
Subjects received $10 or credit toward a psychology course requirement in exchange for their 
participation. I determined sample size before collecting data using recent similar studies as a 
guide. The institutional review board at Washington University in St. Louis approved all of the 
experiments reported in this dissertation, and all subjects were treated according to the American 
Psychological Association’s ethical guidelines. 
2.1.2 Materials 
I used the stimuli from the DeSoto and Roediger (2014) paper, which are presented in Appendix 
A: 12 lists of 20 categorized words, ordered by response frequency, and an additional 120 items 
taken from 12 other categories. 
For counterbalancing purposes, from these 12 lists I constructed two sets of items. One set 
contained the items of even-numbered response frequency position from the first six categorized 
lists and the items in odd-numbered positions from the second six categorized lists. The second 
set contained the alternate items: the odd items from the first six categorized lists and the even 
items from the second six. Thus, each set contained every other item, in terms of response 
frequency, from each original category.  
All experiments in the dissertation were programmed in Adobe Flash (Weinstein, 2012). 
2.1.3 Design and Procedure 
The experiment consisted of three phases: (1) study, (2) distractor, and (3) recognition test. 
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Subjects were assigned randomly to one of two counterbalancing groups. Subjects in the first 
counterbalancing group were assigned to study the items from the first item set, while subjects in 
the second counterbalancing group studied as targets the items from the second item set. 
To investigate effects of presentation modality on recall proportions, subjects were assigned to 
one of two study groups. In the audio presentation group, 36 subjects listened over headphones 
to a recording of a female voice reading the 12 category names and corresponding items. 
Subjects heard a category name (e.g., A Bird), and after a four-second pause heard the 
corresponding 10 items from that category, one item presented every two seconds. The 36 
subjects in the visual presentation group saw the words on the computer screen instead: the 
category name for four seconds, followed by one item per two seconds with a 500 millisecond 
interstimulus interval – a blank screen – between presentations. 
In both groups, category items were presented in random order. Once all items from a category 
were presented, the procedure was repeated with another category, chosen randomly from those 
remaining, until all categories had been presented. Data collection for the audio presentation 
subjects was completed before data collection for the visual presentation subjects. 
After the study phase, subjects completed a five-minute distractor task intended to eliminate 
short-term memory effects. In this task, subjects were asked to recall as many United States 
presidents as possible by typing their names into a box on the computer screen (see Roediger & 
DeSoto, 2014b). 
Immediately following the distractor task, subjects read instructions adapted from Gardiner, 
Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (1998) explaining and describing how to make 
remember/know/guess judgments. See Appendix B for a copy of these instructions. Subjects 
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were instructed to respond remember when they were able to call to mind something they 
remembered thinking about when they heard the word, and know when nothing came to mind but 
the word still seemed familiar from the study phase. Subjects were told to respond guess if they 
did not remember the word and it did not seem familiar, but they still wanted to guess it was a 
studied word. 
After subjects read these instructions, the experimenter read aloud a script that reviewed and 
reinforced the meaning of each judgment. This script is contained in Appendix B. After reading 
these instructions, the experimenter asked for and answered any questions subjects had about the 
procedure and distinctions between remembering, knowing, and guessing. Once no more 
questions remained, subjects were permitted to proceed with the recognition test phase. The 
experimenter remained in the room until the remember/know/guess instructions had been given, 
but remained available throughout the remainder of the study. 
In the recognition test phase, subjects took a recognition test over 360 items which were 
presented one at a time and randomly ordered for each subject: 120 targets, 120 related lures, and 
120 unrelated lures. The targets were the 120 studied items from the 10 categories that had been 
studied by the subjects. The related lures were the 120 items from the 10 categories that had not 
been studied by subjects; these items were the targets for subjects in the alternate 
counterbalancing group. The 120 unrelated lures were 10 items each from 12 nonstudied 
categories. 
For each item on the recognition test, subjects made one or two sequential judgments: (1) an 
old/new recognition decision, and, if the recognition decision was “old,” (2) a 
remember/know/guess judgment. Subjects indicated with a mouse click whether they believed 
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each item to be old (i.e., studied) or new (i.e., nonstudied), and then, if their recognition decision 
was “old,” made a remember/know/guess judgment with a mouse click. Subjects who made a 
recognition decision of “new” did not make a remember/know/guess judgment and proceeded 
immediately to the recognition decision for the next word. 
All subjects were tested in testing rooms individually or in groups up to five. The experiment 
took approximately 45 minutes to complete. 
2.2 Results 
Experiment 1 was aimed at testing effects of presentation modality, rates of remembering, 
knowing, and guessing overall and as a function of response frequency, and assessing the 
remember/know/guess-accuracy relationship. 
2.2.1 Effects of Presentation Modality 
First, I explored how presentation modality affected the way that individuals responded to items 
on the test. The key issue was whether the likelihood of saying “old” to the three different item 
types (targets, related lures, and unrelated lures) differed as a function of experimental group 
(audio presentation vs. visual presentation). These data are contained in Table 2.2, and show that 
response proportions were roughly the same across conditions. 
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Table 2.2: Proportions with which item types were called “old” in the audio and visual presentation 
conditions in Experiment 1. Standard errors of the mean are presented in parentheses. 
Item Audio “Old” Rate Visual “Old” Rate 
Targets .67 (.04) .75 (.02) 
Related Lures .27 (.04) .30 (.03) 
Unrelated Lures .07 (.02)  .06 (.01) 
 
To investigate differences in “old” proportions as a function of condition statistically, three 
planned comparison between-subjects t-tests were conducted for each item type. These t-tests did 
not detect significant differences in “old” proportion (i.e., hits) for targets, t(62) = 1.77, p =.08 – 
although the effect was marginally significant – or in old proportion for related lures (i.e., false 
alarm proportion), t(62) = 0.59, p = 0.56, or unrelated lures, t(62) = 0.70, p = 0.49, between 
groups. The marginally significant result for targets is in a direction consistent with the modality 
effect literature – perhaps subjects were slightly better at monitoring visual targets at test when 
they were presented visually at study (in a sense, a transfer appropriate processing-type effect). 
Overall, though, no significant differences in “old” proportion for specific item types were 
detected as a function of presentation modality.  
I also conducted an independent-samples t-test to examine differences in d’, a measure of 
memory discrimination, between conditions. Subjects showed numerically better discrimination 
between targets and all lures in the visual condition (M = 1.75) than in the audio condition (M = 
1.65), but the t-test did not indicate a statistically significant difference, t(62) = 0.66, p = .51. No 
differences were found between conditions in c, a measure of bias, either, t(62) = 1.18, p = .24.  
Thus, in Experiment 1, audio presentation did not lead to more false alarms than visual 
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presentation. This outcome differs from the usual finding when associative lists are presented in 
the two different modalities – in these cases, false alarms in the audio condition outnumber false 
alarms in the visual condition. In one of the few papers comparing modality effects for 
associative and categorized lists, Pierce and colleagues (2005) found more false alarms for audio 
than for visual presentation in categorized lists. They used a categorized list procedure in which 
only the item of highest response frequency was absent at study and present at test, unlike in this 
experiment, however, where alternating items were studied and all were tested. It is possible that 
the procedural differences accounts for varying outcomes in the two experiments. To explore this 
possibility, I examined the false alarm proportions to the top two items in terms of output 
dominance (two instead of one due to the way counterbalancing occurred) in both visual and 
audio groups. False alarm proportion for the top two items appeared higher in the visual 
condition (M = .40) than in the audio condition (M = .35) – a finding in the opposite direction of 
the expected one – but an independent-samples t-test did not identify a statistically significant 
difference, t(62) = 0.76, p = .45.  
Given these findings, I combined the audio presentation group and visual presentation groups for 
all subsequent analyses, and used visual presentation in Experiments 2, 3, and 4. 
2.2.2 Probabilities of Remembering, Knowing, and Guessing   
Next, I investigated the proportions with which targets, related lures, and unrelated lures were 
called “old,” and the proportions with which remember, know, and guess judgments were 
provided following “old” responses. These data are presented in Table 2.3. The table shows that 
“old” decisions were most common for targets, less common for related lures, and even less 
common for unrelated lures. More specifically, remember responses appeared most frequently 
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for targets, whereas the most common response was less clear for related and unrelated lures. 
These results mirror the findings of Dewhurst (2001), shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.3: Proportions of remembering, knowing, and guessing for the three different item types on the 
recognition test in Experiment 1. Standard errors of the mean are presented in parentheses. 
Item Type Total “Old” Remember Know Guess 
Targets .71 (.02) .39 (.03) .21 (.02) .11 (.01) 
Related Lures .28 (.02) .04 (.01) .10 (.02) .14 (.02) 
Unrelated Lures .07 (.01) .01 (.00) .03 (.01) .03 (.01) 
 
To determine statistically the differences in proportion of remembering, knowing, and guessing 
to the three different item types, a 3 (item type: target, related lure, unrelated lure) x 3 (response 
type: remember, know, guess) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on response 
proportion. This ANOVA revealed a significant interaction, F(4, 252) = 58.57, p < .001, η2p = 
.48. Tests of simple effects and subsequent Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons holding 
item type constant detected more remembering than knowing and more knowing than guessing 
for targets, but less remembering than either knowing or guessing for both related and unrelated 
lures. Holding response type constant, remember and know responses were more common for 
targets than related lures, and more common for related lures than unrelated lures. Guess 
responses were most frequently assigned to related lures, then targets, then unrelated lures (all 
significant Fs > 10.97, all significant ps < .001). 
To summarize, targets received remember judgments most frequently, but lures received know 
and guess judgments most frequently. Subjects were most likely to retrieve episodic and 
contextual details when presented with words that had been presented. Additionally, subjects 
responded “old” more regularly to targets than either type of lure.        
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The low proportion of false remembering in this procedure is of theoretical interest as it differs 
considerably from proportions of false remembering for associative (i.e., DRM-type) lists. 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) found that an “old” responses followed by a remember 
judgment occurred around 50% of the time a critical lure was encountered; in contrast, in this 
experiment, a remember response was assigned to a related lure approximately 4% of the time 
(and only 1% of the time for unrelated lures). This finding suggests potential qualitative 
differences in the nature of false memories evoked by categorized versus associative lists, or 
perhaps different mechanisms through which these errors arise (for a discussion, see Knott, 
Dewhurst, & Howe, 2012; Park, Shobe, & Kihlstrom, 2005). As Dewhurst (2001) found, 
however, cases of false remembering do tend to occur to items higher in response frequency. 
This is illustrated in the following section. 
2.2.3 Remembering, Knowing, and Guessing and Response Frequency 
Dewhurst (2001) reported proportions of remembering, knowing, and guessing for items both 
high and low in frequency. The procedure used in Experiment 1 permitted investigation of 
remembering, knowing, and guessing proportions across a wider and gradated range of response 
frequency values than Dewhurst used. These response proportions as a function of response 
frequency are shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Proportions of remembering, knowing, and guessing as a function of response frequency for 
correct recognition and false recognition. Best fitting linear functions (see Table 2.4) are indicated by the 
dotted lines. 
The relationship between response proportion and response frequency were assessed with 
Pearson correlations, which are shown in Table 2.4. The figure and table indicate together that 
for correct recognition, remembering was more frequent for low response frequency items (i.e., 
those less frequently mentioned by subjects in norming studies) than high response frequency 
items, and guessing was more common for high response frequency items than low response 
frequency items. In contrast, in false recognition, subjects were more likely to respond remember 
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and know to items high in response frequency than low in response frequency. 
Table 2.4: Correlations between response frequency of items and response proportion for both correct and 
false recognition. A negative correlation indicates that the response type was greater for high response 
frequency items than low response frequency items. *p < .01. 
 Correct Recognition False Recognition 
Remember -.91* -.88* 
Know -.20* -.71* 
Guess -.70* -.43* 
 
The variance in response rate as a function of response frequency is low here (e.g., response 
frequency 1 remember hit proportion = .35, response frequency 20 remember hit proportion = 
.46), which inflates the magnitude of the correlations, but response frequency is nevertheless a 
reasonable predictor of that variance.  
Again, the findings reported here are consistent with Dewhurst’s (2001) observations. Both 
Dewhurst’s study and Experiment 1 showed greater correct remembering for lower frequency 
than higher frequency words, an effect that is similar to the influence of (printed) word frequency 
on recognition memory (e.g., Balota & Neely, 1980). Similarly, both Dewhurst’s study and 
Experiment 1 showed greater false remembering for higher frequency than lower frequency 
words. Perhaps, as Dewhurst theorized, category associates are generated at encoding, and words 
of higher response frequency are more likely to be generated than words of lower response 
frequency and falsely recognized at the time of test (an extended discussion of this theory is 
provided in DeSoto, 2011). 
Another explanation is that unique and unusual items — those lower in response frequency —
may more readily engender item-level processing that keeps responding accurate; however, 
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processes that lead to false alarms may be more likely for those items that are more frequent, 
dominant, or accessible within the category (see McDaniel & Bugg, 2008, for a framework that 
may explain these data). 
These data can be contrasted with data from a pilot study we conducted in which 40 subjects 
studied category items and then took a category cued recall test and provided confidence ratings. 
The results are depicted in Figure 2.2. This figure shows that both correct recalls and intrusions 
were more frequent for items of higher response frequency than those of lower response 
frequency, which is a different pattern than the one that emerges for old/new recognition. 
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Figure 2.2: Number of correctly recalled words and intrusions in an unpublished study using a cued recall 
version of the categorized list procedure. 
2.2.4 Old/New Recognition Accuracy 
I turn next to average accuracy for remember, know, and guess judgments to assess the 
remember/know/guess judgment’s validity in monitoring memory accuracy. Figure 2.3 shows 
accuracy for these three judgment types – that is, the accuracy for “old” recognition decisions 
assigned one of these three judgments (e.g., the number of correct remember responses divided 
by the total number of remember responses). This is a type of output-bound scoring (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996), showing, for instance, the proportion of correct remember responses 
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(remember hits) out of all the remember responses provided. 
As the figure shows, the accuracy for remembered responses was greater than the accuracy for 
know responses, and the accuracy for knows was greater than the accuracy for guesses. These 
observations were confirmed by a within-subjects ANOVA, F(2, 122) = 182.025, p < .001, η2p = 
.75, and subsequent pairwise comparisons (all ps < .001).  
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Figure 2.3: Accuracy for responses assigned remember, know, and guess judgments in Experiment 1. 
Error bars show the 95% confidence interval of the mean. The number of observations of each response 
type are presented in parentheses. 
2.2.5 Logistic Regression 
Across the studies presented in this dissertation, I also use logistic regression to show the 
relationship between remembering, knowing, and guessing and accuracy here and 
remember/know/guess, confidence, and accuracy in subsequent experiments. These additional 
analyses, which support the analyses reported in the main text, are described in Appendix C. 
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2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 1 was aimed at investigating effects of presentation modality and also the rates of 
remember/know/guess judgments and how these judgments related to recognition accuracy. I 
found that there was no difference in hit or false alarm rates when words were presented visually 
versus when they were presented auditorily. My results also replicated the findings of Dewhurst 
(2001): False remembering in this procedure was rare, and more common for items of higher 
output dominance than lower output dominance. Overall, remember responses were more 
accurate than knows, and knows more accurate than guesses. 
Experiment 1 did not demonstrate effects of presentation modality on responding. As stated 
earlier, for categorized lists, modality effects have been found using experiments where only the 
item of highest response frequency is withheld from study and presented at test. My analyses did 
not observe a modality effect for even the highest output dominance items, however. Pierce et al. 
(2005) proposed that modality effects are caused by differences in monitoring processes that 
occur at the time of test. It is possible that requiring subjects to make remember/know/guess 
judgments standardized (or even altered) the way subjects in both groups made recognition 
decisions, thereby eliminating the modality effect. 
Nevertheless, these results are surprising, especially considering that research has found that 
remember/know/guess judgments tend to emphasize modality differences rather than attenuate 
them. As an example, R. E. Smith, Hunt, and Gallagher (2008) presented DRM lists via auditory 
and visual modalities and found that recognition performance was similar between modalities 
(i.e., no modality effect appeared) when subjects did not take a recall test before the recognition 
test, as occurs in some versions of modality effect experiments. Contradicting the present 
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findings, however, in a follow-up study, the researchers found that asking subjects to make 
remember/know/guess judgments at test made the modality effects reappear. Likewise, Mulligan, 
Besken, and Peterson (2010) had subjects study unrelated word lists in different modalities and 
found that differences did not emerge on standard old/new recognition tests without 
remember/know/guess judgments, but that differences did appear when remember/know/guess 
judgments were required. Thus, these findings remain a theoretical puzzle. 
The previous discussions of confidence ratings and remember/know/guess judgments suggest 
that both reports reveal rememberers’ abilities to monitor between accurate and inaccurate 
memories. Can memory monitoring be improved even further by combining the two judgments? 
As others (e.g., Dobbins et al., 1998; Wixted and Mickes, 2010) have suggested, there is 
theoretical utility to doing so. Wixted and Mickes wrote, “The attempt to understand memory in 
terms of either strength or content is misplaced because both ideas are needed” (2010, p. 1025), 
referring to confidence ratings and remember/know/guess judgments, respectively. 
In sum, Experiment 1 established that remember/know/guess judgments are viable in the 
categorized list procedure used by DeSoto and Roediger (2014), and that this procedure can be 
implemented successfully using either an auditory or visual study phase. In Experiment 2, I take 
Wixted and Mickes’ (2010) recommendation into account and combine confidence ratings and 
remember/know/guess judgments into the same procedure, investigating the relationship between 
both strength and content of recognition memory for category items. 
Chapter 3: Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, I integrated both confidence ratings and remember/know/guess judgments into 
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the DeSoto and Roediger (2014) categorized list procedure. Doing so allowed the investigation 
of the ways that confidence, remember/know/guess, and old/new recognition accuracy interact.  
The central aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between confidence and 
accuracy as a function of remember/know/guess judgment. I did so using two different methods: 
four types of confidence-accuracy correlations (introduced by Roediger et al., 2012) and 
calibration plots. 
The effect that the qualitative nature of memory (i.e., remembering, knowing, or guessing) has on 
the relationship between confidence and accuracy is unclear, and has not been much studied 
(although see Dobbins et al., 1998; Wixted & Mickes, 2010). According to predictions from the 
continuous dual-process model, items that are remembered are more likely to be higher in 
strength of evidence than items that are known, and thus items that receive remember responses 
on a test should be higher in confidence and accuracy than items that are known overall. Ingram 
and colleagues (2012) and others have obtained this finding with unrelated words.  
The continuous dual-process model predicts that when confidence is controlled for, however, 
there should be no differences in the confidence-accuracy relationship for remember judgments 
compared to know judgments. This is because both recollection and familiarity contribute to 
old/new accuracy, and confidence ratings describe the magnitude of this contribution. Thus, 
items that are responded to with higher confidence, regardless of whether they are assigned 
remember or know judgments, should be more accurate. Put differently, according to the 
continuous dual-process model, the remember versus know distinction is irrelevant for old/new 
recognition accuracy (when confidence is controlled for; see Figure 1.5). 
I also predicted that increases in confidence should be tied to increases in accuracy of similar 
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magnitude regardless of whether a memory is remembered or known. Although this is not 
explicitly stated by the continuous dual-process theory, it is a reasonable expectation: Because 
recollection and familiarity combine to support old/new recognition accuracy, and because this 
combination is indexed by confidence ratings, confidence should correlate with accuracy 
regardless of what processes feed into the strength of evidence experienced. Put a different way, 
the continuous dual-process model makes the claim that recollection + familiarity = confidence = 
accuracy. If this statement is true, confidence corresponds with accuracy to the same degree 
regardless of the specific degrees of recollection and familiarity. (This equation changes when 
source memory is tested instead of old/new recognition – for more, see Experiments 3 and 4).  
To test these hypotheses, I collected both confidence ratings and remember/know/guess 
judgments after recognition decisions in the categorized list procedure. In subsequent analyses, I 
subdivided all “old” recognition memory decisions by whether they were accompanied by 
remember, know, or guess judgments. My prediction, based off the continuous dual-process 
model, was that despite higher overall accuracy for remember responses compared to know 
responses, the confidence-accuracy correlation for remember responses would be no different 
than the confidence-accuracy correlation for know responses. I expected guess judgments to not 
show much of a relationship between confidence and accuracy, since guessing is, by definition, 
guessing. 
 
3.1 Method 
In Experiment 2, I used the same design as in Experiment 1 but introduced confidence ratings 
into the procedure to accompany the remember/know/guess judgments. Subjects studied different 
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category items and were tested on studied and nonstudied items. On the following recognition 
test, subjects made old/new recognition decisions and then rated their confidence in their 
recognition decision using a sliding scale. Following the confidence rating, subjects made 
remember/know/guess judgments for items called “old.” 
3.1.1 Subjects 
I recruited 64 subjects from the Washington University in St. Louis psychology experiment 
subject pool. There were 17 men, 46 women, and one subject who selected “other/prefer not to 
respond” when asked about gender (mean age = 20.38, SD = 1.88, min age = 18, max = 28). I 
determined sample size before collecting data by using the number of subjects in Experiment 1 
as a guide. Subjects received $10 or credit for a psychology course requirement in exchange for 
their participation. 
3.1.2 Materials and Design 
Materials were the same as in Experiment 1, but to shorten the experiment, two lists were 
eliminated: A Four-Legged Animal and A Part of the Human Body (see Appendix A). These lists 
were chosen because they produced the lowest false alarm proportions in Experiment 1. This left 
a stimulus set of 200 potential targets and related lures. To maintain equivalent proportions of 
related lures and unrelated lures, 20 unrelated lures were also removed from the stimulus set, 
leaving 100 remaining (Appendix A shows which unrelated lures were removed). 
As in Experiment 1, two between-subjects counterbalancing groups, randomly assigned, were 
employed. Thirty-two subjects participated in each group. Subjects in the first group studied the 
even response frequency items from half the lists and the odd response frequency items from the 
other half. The second counterbalancing group studied the alternate items. 
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In Experiment 2, unlike in Experiment 1, all items were presented visually. 
3.1.3 Procedure 
As in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 consisted of three phases: (1) study, (2) distractor, and (3) 
recognition test. In the study phase, subjects studied the 100 targets, presented in the center of 
the computer screen (as in the visual presentation group in Experiment 1). The distractor task 
also proceeded as it had in Experiment 1. 
The recognition test included two or three sequential steps for each item: (1) recognition 
decision, (2) confidence rating, and, if necessary, (3) remember/know/guess judgment. For each 
item on the recognition test, subjects indicated whether they believed the item to be old or new. 
Next, subjects reported how confident they were that their recognition decision was correct. A 
slider appeared on the screen ranging from 0 (not at all confident) to 100 (entirely confident; 
DeSoto, 2014); subjects clicked on the slider head, which had a default position of 50, and 
dragged it to the desired point on the scale. They then clicked a button to submit their confidence 
rating. Last, subjects who responded “old” during the recognition decision step made a 
remember/know/guess judgment. Subjects who made a recognition decision of “new” did not 
make a remember/know/guess judgment and proceeded immediately to the recognition decision 
for the next word. 
This procedure is different from the one used by Ingram et al. (2012), who collected confidence 
ratings, remember/know/guess judgments, and recognition decisions with one click (Figure 1.7). 
I chose to collect the judgments sequentially to keep data collection consistent with prior 
categorized list procedure studies and also to avoid any unexpected consequences of using this 
unusual scale. 
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Subjects were tested in groups of one to five. The experiment took less than an hour for most 
subjects to complete. 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Calculating the Confidence-Accuracy Relation 
Before describing the results of Experiment 2, I will outline the different ways the confidence-
accuracy relationship will be calculated throughout the three remaining dissertation experiments. 
I will use two general types of analysis: confidence-accuracy correlations and calibration plots. 
Four Kinds of Confidence-Accuracy Correlation 
Roediger and DeSoto (2014a) and DeSoto and Roediger (2014) calculated confidence in three of 
the ways discussed in a chapter by Roediger et al. (2012). We call these three methods the 
between-events, between-subjects, and within-subjects confidence-accuracy correlations. The 
between-events (or between-items) confidence-accuracy correlation asks the question, “Are 
items that are remembered with greater confidence also more likely to be remembered 
accurately?” This (often unreported) correlation is calculated by taking the average confidence 
and average accuracy (i.e., hit proportion or correct rejection proportion) for each individual 
item, then calculating a Pearson correlation (r) among those items. 
The between-subjects correlation, on the other hand, asks, “Are subjects who are more confident 
also more accurate?” This is a question more typical for the domains of metacognition and law. 
This correlation is calculated by taking the average confidence and average accuracy for each 
subject averaged across items and then obtaining the Pearson correlation among the subjects. 
Lastly, the within-subjects confidence-accuracy correlation is what metacognitive researchers 
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often call resolution (Nelson, 1984). It measures the correspondence between confidence and 
accuracy within each individual subject by asking the question, “On average, when individual 
subjects are more confident on a given response, are they also more likely to be accurate?” 
Instead of being calculated with a Pearson correlation, resolution is calculated with the 
Goodman-Kruskal gamma (γ). These gamma correlations are averaged over subjects for 
subsequent analysis (note that the use of gamma has certain disadvantages; see Benjamin & 
Diaz, 2008). 
One new way to calculate confidence-accuracy correlations that I will use in this dissertation, not 
included in the Roediger et al. (2012) chapter, I call the within-events correlation.1 This 
correlation applies the machinery of gamma correlations to individual items, instead of 
individual subjects, to ask the question, “On average, when individual (or specific) items are 
responded to with more confidence, are they more likely to be responded to accurately?” This is 
a valuable correlation to consider because it can help identify the items that are most deceptive 
(or consensually wrong) within the materials used. As I will show, these results in the aggregate 
are very similar to the results of the within-subjects correlations. 
Although these correlations all address similar questions about the relationship between 
confidence and accuracy, and although they are likely to be interrelated, they need not agree 
(although I will show that they usually do). Considering confidence-accuracy correlations in 
these different ways allows a more thorough investigation of complexities involved. 
                                                
 
1 Thanks to Jason Finley for contributing this idea. 
 69 
Calibration Plots 
Another way of showing the relation between confidence and accuracy is through the use of a 
calibration plot (e.g., Lichtenstein et al., 1982). Calibration plots depict the average accuracy for 
responses assigned certain ranges (or bins) of confidence ratings (e.g., showing average accuracy 
for all judgments assigned a confidence rating of, say, 80-100). The calibration plots I will 
present in this dissertation are obtained by combining all items for all subjects. To provide an 
example of a calibration plot, as well as a comparison condition for later analyses, I reanalyzed 
the data from Experiment 1 of DeSoto and Roediger (2014) and present them in a calibration plot 
shown in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Calibration in Experiment 1 of DeSoto and Roediger (2014) as a function of item type. Error 
bars show the 95% confidence interval of the mean. The number of observations are presented beside 
each point. 
This figure shows average accuracy for the three different item types used in our experiment 
across different levels of confidence. Inspection of this plot confirms the story told by the 
correlational data reported in the summary of this research presented earlier. 
In this study, we found that for targets, when confidence was higher, so too was accuracy (i.e., 
hit proportion). On the other hand, for related lures, responses made with greater confidence 
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were less likely to be correct (i.e., more likely to receive false alarms). This pattern of over- and 
under-confidence can be described as a hard-easy effect (Suantak, Bolger, & Ferrell, 1996), that 
is, a likelihood to overestimate the difficulty of easy tasks and underestimate the difficulty of 
hard tasks. For unrelated lures, however, the correct rejection proportion was near ceiling 
regardless of the level of confidence provided. Combining across all item types, however – an 
analysis that is not plotted here – confidence was only weakly associated with accuracy, with the 
strongest association at the upper half of the confidence scale. Average proportion correct was 
.68, .65, .66, .71, and .86 for confidence ratings of 0-19, 20-39, 40-59, 60-79, and 80-100, 
respectively. 
In the results to Experiment 2, I will also show calibration plots for old/new accuracy as a 
function of item type, as above, but will also show calibration plots that depict accuracy by 
confidence as a function of remember, know, and guess judgment. 
3.2.2 Probabilities of Remembering, Knowing, and Guessing 
Table 3.1 presents the probabilities with which subjects responded remember, know, and guess to 
targets, related lures, and unrelated lures on the recognition test in Experiment 2, and the 
confidence ratings provided with those judgments. A 3 (item type: target, related lure, unrelated 
lure) x 3 (response type: remember/know/guess) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on 
response proportion and revealed a significant interaction, F(4, 252) = 110.88, p < .001, η2p = 
.64. Tests of simple main effects and subsequent Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons 
holding item type constant detected more remembering than knowing and more knowing than 
guessing for targets, but less remembering than either knowing or guessing for both related and 
unrelated lures, on average, an identical pattern to what was shown in Experiment 1. Holding 
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response type constant, remember and know responses were more common for targets on average 
than related lures, and more common for related lures than unrelated lures. Guess responses were 
most frequently assigned to related lures, then targets, then unrelated lures (all significant Fs > 
8.31, all significant ps < .005).  
Table 3.1: Probabilities of remembering, knowing, and guessing for the three item types in Experiment 2, 
as well as confidence ratings provided with those responses. Standard errors of the mean are presented in 
parentheses. 
 Remember  Know  Guess 
Item 
Type Proportion Confidence 
 Proportion Confidence  Proportion Confidence 
Targets .47 (.02) 90 (1)  .21 (.01) 70 (2)  .08 (.01) 41 (2) 
Related 
Lures .08 (.01) 77 (2) 
 .14 (.01) 62 (2)  .12 (.01) 37 (2) 
Unrelated 
Lures .02 (.00) 68 (3) 
 .05 (.01) 61 (3)  .06 (.01) 35 (2) 
 
These results closely replicated the results of Experiment 1 – remembering was most common 
for targets called “old”, but knowing and guessing were more frequent for lures called “old.” In 
general, of course, subjects responded “old” more regularly to studied items than to lures. 
In Experiment 2, I was also able to investigate differences in confidence as a function of item 
type and remember/know/guess judgment (Table 3.1). To explore these differences statistically, a 
3 (item type: target, related lure, unrelated lure) x 3 (response type: remember/know/guess) 
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on confidence ratings, revealing a significant 
interaction, F(4, 92) = 4.79, p = .001, η2p = .17. Tests of simple main effects and subsequent 
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons holding item type constant revealed greater 
confidence in remember responses on average than know responses, and greater confidence for 
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knows than guesses to both targets and related lures, on average. For unrelated lures, guess 
confidence was significantly lower than remember and know confidence. Holding response type 
constant, both remembers and knows to targets were more confident on average than remembers 
and knows to related lures, and those were more confident than remembers and knows to 
unrelated lures. Meanwhile, confidence in guesses was greater for targets than for unrelated lures 
(all significant Fs > 7.51, all significant ps < .002). Thus, confidence is greatest at the top left of 
the table and decreases as it moves right (i.e., to know and guess) and down (i.e., to related lures 
and unrelated lures). It is illustrated in Figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3.2: Confidence as a function of remember, know, and guess judgment in Experiment 2. Error bars 
show the 95% confidence interval of the mean. 
These confidence results accord with the results provided in Table 2.3 (as well as the response 
probabilities presented in the same table, roughly). The finding that confidence for “old” 
responses to targets is greater than confidence for false alarms to related and unrelated lures is 
consistent with our prior work (e.g., DeSoto & Roediger, 2014). Meanwhile, the observation that 
remember confidence was the greatest also agrees with the continuous dual-process model and 
other research (e.g., Mickes, Wais, & Wixted, 2009; Wixted & Mickes, 2010). 
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3.2.3 Old/New Recognition Accuracy 
Calibration in Experiment 1 as a function of item type is shown in Figure 3.3. This figure depicts 
the probabilities that responses to targets, related lures, and unrelated lures were correct for 
different levels of confidence. As the figure shows, accuracy increased with confidence for all 
item types. Comparing this result to Figure 3.1, calibration by item type in DeSoto and Roediger, 
2014, Experiment 1, shows that the pattern for related lures in Experiment 2 of this dissertation is 
different from what we obtained in earlier research – specifically, accuracy in responses to 
related lures increased with increased in accuracy, rather than decreased. This point is curious, 
and worthy of additional investigation; it is possible that the addition of remember/know/guess 
judgments to the categorized list procedure caused the difference. Perhaps subjects become 
additionally reliant on recollection over familiarity when making memory decisions, for instance, 
or are less susceptible to tricky deceptive items when they must analyze the basis of their 
decision carefully. These effects may be similar to the weak effects of providing a warning in the 
DRM paradigm (e.g., McDermott & Roediger, 1998), with remember/know/guess instructions 
serving to heighten subjects’ awareness of the possibility of making errors. I hope to investigate 
this issue in follow-up research. In the interim, however, because related lure accuracy does not 
decrease with confidence, the confidence-accuracy correlation should not be expected to be 
negative for these items when these correlations are computed in the following section. Yet, the 
confidence-accuracy correlation for related lures is weaker than the correlation for the other item 
types, as I will show in the following section. 
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Figure 3.3: Calibration in Experiment 2 as a function of item type. Error bars show the 95% confidence 
interval of the mean. The number of observations are presented beside each point. 
Figure 3.4 shows calibration curves as a function of remember/know/guess judgments (in 
contrast to Figure 3.3, which shows calibration as a function of item type – thus, these two 
figures cannot be compared directly). This figure illustrates the relationship between confidence 
and accuracy as a function of whether recognition decisions were labeled remember, know, or 
guess. 
For each point on the calibration curve, I calculated the corresponding value in the following 
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way: First, I took all recognition responses within a given range of confidence ratings. Then, I 
counted the total number of correct recognition responses (i.e., hits, given that the analysis was 
over remember/know/guess judgments) within that confidence bracket. Last, I divided that 
number by the total number of responses (i.e., hits and false alarms). As an example, in 
Experiment 2, there were 2881 times that an individual said “old,” rated confidence between 80 
and 100, and assigned a remember judgment. A total of 2606 of these were accurate (hits) – 
about .90 correct. 
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Figure 3.4: Calibration in Experiment 2 for responses assigned remember, know, and guess judgments. 
Error bars show the 95% confidence interval of the mean. The number of observations are presented 
beside each point. 
Inspection of Figure 3.4 reveals several patterns of interest. First, confidence is associated with 
accuracy for remembering and knowing, meaning that for both response types increases in 
confidence are associated with increases in accuracy, especially at the higher end of the 
confidence scale. Additionally, throughout the range of confidence ratings, controlling for 
confidence, remember responses are more accurate than know responses, and know responses are 
more accurate than guess responses. In fact, guess responses do not much differ from 33% 
.00 
.25 
.50 
.75 
1.00 
0-19 20-39 40-59 60-79 80-100 
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
C
or
re
ct
 
Confidence 
Remember Know Guess 
14 98 
192 482 
2881 
47 
313 
596 813 
840 
332 
576 469 269 
61 
 79 
accuracy overall, regardless of the confidence rating assigned – they really appear to be guesses. 
Put differently, the calibration data reveal two main effects – remembering is more likely to be 
accurate (M = .82) than knowing (M = .52) and knowing more accurate than guessing (M = .31), 
and judgments made with higher confidence (according to 20-point bins) are more likely to be 
correct than those made with lower confidence, too (Ms = .49, .63, .70, .75, and .89, working up 
the scale). These were independently confirmed through two within-subjects ANOVAs, one for 
accuracy and one for confidence, F(2, 124) = 152.63, p < .001, η2p = .71 for accuracy and F(4, 
208) = 49.161, p < .001, η2p = .49 for confidence, with subjects as the unit of analysis. In sum, 
combining confidence ratings with remember/know/guess judgments provides more information 
about subsequent accuracy more than when confidence or a remember/know/guess judgment is 
provided alone. The high confidence remember responses (M = .90 correct) were more accurate 
than high confidence knows (M = .74) or guesses (M = .39), although not many high confidence 
guess responses were provided. 
3.2.4 Confidence-Accuracy Correlations 
We have remarked in other publications (e.g., Roediger & DeSoto, 2014c) that a potential 
criticism of current work investigating the confidence-accuracy relation is that researchers 
generally assess the confidence-accuracy relation in only one way. Therefore, along with 
calibration curves, I also analyzed the Experiment 2 data using the three types of confidence-
accuracy correlations described by Roediger et al. (2012). As mentioned earlier, the between-
events correlation (sometimes called the between-items correlation) indexes whether items that 
are responded to with greater confidence are also responded to with greater accuracy. The 
between-subjects correlation describes the degree to which subjects who are more confident are 
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also more accurate. The within-subjects correlation (a measure of resolution) describes whether 
judgments made with greater confidence were likelier to be accurate for individuals on average. 
For the first time I also present a within-events (or within-items) correlation, which describes the 
degree to which responses to individual items were more likely to be accurate when they were 
made more confidently, on average. Between-subjects and between-events correlations are 
computed with the Pearson r, whereas within-subjects and within-events correlations are 
computed with the Goodman-Kruskal γ.  
Table 3.2 contains the four correlations for each of the three different classes of item on the 
recognition test. Within an item class, the correlations agree: The confidence-accuracy 
correlations are strongly positive for targets, but generally weakly positive for related lures. The 
correlations for unrelated lures occupy an intermediate position. This table generally replicates 
our earlier findings (DeSoto & Roediger, 2014), except that the related lure correlations that 
were negative in that paper are null or weakly positive here, as discussed in the prior section. 
Again, it is possible that the introduction of the remember/know/guess judgment helped to 
prevent against the confidence-accuracy inversion for these items. 
Also note that the contents of Table 3.2 are consistent with the results displayed graphically in 
Figure 3.3. 
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Table 3.2: Confidence-accuracy correlations for the three item types. Between-units correlations 
calculated using Pearson r, within-units correlations calculated with Goodman-Kruskal γ.   *p < .05 **p < 
.01 
Item Type Between-Subjects Within-Subjects Between-Events Within-Events 
Targets .67** .66** .53** .65** 
Related Lures .27** .11**  .12**  .12** 
Unrelated Lures .44** .33** .55** .35** 
 
These correlations show that targets and unrelated lures are relatively nondeceptive items, 
whereas related lures were more deceptive. 
Because I collected remember/know/guess judgments, I was also able to investigate the 
confidence-accuracy correlations for items that are remembered, known, or guessed in the ways 
outlined by Roediger and colleagues (2012) – a type of calculation that has never been presented 
in the literature. Table 3.3 contains these data. Note that “new” recognition responses must be 
excluded from analysis as they were neither remembered, known, nor guessed, and also that 
unrelated lures must be excluded from analysis because every remember, know, or guess 
judgment to an item of this type is incorrect (and thus inclusion of these items artificially 
decreases the confidence-accuracy correlation). (Between- and within-item correlations for 
remember, know, and guess judgments can only be calculated in a procedure like this one where 
the same items are targets for half of subjects and lures for the other half, and vice versa, which 
is only sometimes the case.) 
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Table 3.3: Confidence-accuracy correlations for remembered, known, and guessed memories as a function 
of remember/know/guess judgment. Between-units correlations calculated using Pearson r, within-units 
correlations calculated with Goodman-Kruskal γ. *p < .05 **p < .01 
 Between-Subjects Within-Subjects Between-Events Within-Events 
Remember .72** .44** .52** .57** 
Know .68** .25** .47** .41** 
Guess .19**  .06**  .06**  .05**  
 
The table shows that when subjects responded with a remember or know judgment, there was a 
positive association between confidence and accuracy. In contrast, when subjects were guessing, 
the relationship between confidence and accuracy was nonsignificant. A critical test of the results 
was to compare the correlations of remember and know responses. On one hand, Fisher r-to-z 
tests failed to identify significant differences between the between-subjects (z = 0.43, p = .67) 
and the between-events (z = 0.66, p = .51) confidence-accuracy correlations for remembered 
versus known memories. On the other hand, though, there were significant differences between 
the within-subjects (paired-samples t[51] = 2.37, p = .022) and the within-items (paired-samples 
t[171] = 4.58, p < .001) confidence-accuracy correlations for remembered versus known 
memories. These differences may emerge partially as a function of the sensitivity of the different 
tests (i.e., Fisher r-to-z vs. paired-samples t-test). Numerically, however, all know correlations 
are lower than remember correlations – a finding that will be repeated in the later studies. 
As a visual illustration of the confidence-accuracy correlation as a function of remembering, 
knowing, and guessing, examine Figure 3.5, which presents a scatterplot depicting one of the 
four correlations analyzed – the between-events correlation (i.e., the third column of Table 3.3). 
This figure, which shows average confidence and average accuracy assigned to individual items, 
shows that as responses move from guess to know to remember, they generally increase in both 
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confidence and accuracy. At the same time, though, variability exists within the 
remember/know/guess options – although there is remarkably little overlap, on average, among 
the three. This lack of overlap is a hint, perhaps best saved for future investigations, that at least 
in this procedure confidence and remember/know/guess represent (or function on) the same 
continuum. 
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Figure 3.5: The between-events confidence-accuracy plot for remembered, known, and guessed items. 
Each point represents the average confidence assigned to an item and the average accuracy of that item. 
Linear trendlines are included. 
Last, logistic regression analyses are shown in Appendix C. 
3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 2 had several main findings. First, as Experiment 1 demonstrated, remembering was 
most common for targets whereas knowing and guessing were most common for related and 
unrelated lures. These findings diverge from the common finding using associative lists, where 
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false remembering is frequent for nonpresented associates. 
The comparatively low remember false alarm rate hints at differences between the processes that 
engender false recognition in categorized lists versus associative lists. Dewhurst (2001) stated 
that false alarms to category members arise due to generation processes that occur at study and 
subsequent source memory errors, but such errors would be predicted to be remember-type 
errors, rather than the know and guess errors found in this study. An alternative account is 
provided by S. M. Smith et al. (2001), who hypothesized that false memories that occur for 
associative lists are caused by processing that occurs during study, whereas false memories that 
occur for categorized materials are caused through contributions of semantic knowledge at test. 
Although S. M. Smith et al. (2001) did not collect remember/know/guess judgments in their 
study, their account is consistent with the high probabilities of false knowing and guessing 
occurring here. If subjects bring semantic knowledge to bear when making recognition decisions, 
recollection should be less likely to be present. Rather, familiarity should play a greater role. 
Experiment 2 also showed the relationship between confidence and remember/know/guess 
responses in predicting accuracy. In it, I found that decisions made with higher confidence were 
more likely to be accurate – consistent with the continuous dual-process model – and that 
remember responses were more likely to be accurate than knows, and knows more than guessing, 
even when controlling for level of confidence. As discussed earlier, this finding is not as 
predicted by the continuous dual-process model. Even Wixted and Mickes (2010) found higher 
old/new accuracy for remember judgments than for know judgments in one of their studies, 
though, even when controlling for confidence. They suggested this pattern appeared because 
subjects were asked to make source decisions prior to making old/new recognition decisions. In 
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Experiment 2 of this dissertation, however, no source decisions were collected, hinting that 
another explanation may be necessary. 
I also calculated the confidence-accuracy correlation in the four ways detailed by Roediger et al. 
(2012), applying these correlations for the first time to remember/know/guess judgments. In all 
cases, the confidence-accuracy correlation for remember responses was numerically (statistically 
significant or nonsignificant depending on method of analysis) greater than the correlation for 
knows, and the confidence-accuracy correlations for know responses were always significantly 
greater than the correlations for guesses. This new analysis is one way of showing that 
confidence is more meaningful, or predictive, in a state of remembering than in a state of 
knowing or guessing. The implication here is that each unit of confidence in a remember state 
carries more information about likely old/new accuracy than in other states. 
The practical implication of this finding is that it may provide rememberers with an additional 
mechanism through which they can evaluate potential recognition accuracy. Given two know 
decisions of 25 and 75 confidence and two remember decisions of 25 and 75 confidence, it is 
likely that a larger difference in probability correct exists for the remember decisions. Could 
rememberers use such a heuristic when making recognition decisions? Recognition performance 
appears strikingly resistant to such tools (e.g., memory recommendations; Selmeczy & Dobbins, 
2013), so more study is necessary. 
In sum, Experiment 2 found that remember, know, and guess judgments all showed different 
relationships between confidence and accuracy, a result not immediately accounted for by the 
continuous dual-process model. A large component of the model, however, makes predictions 
for performance on source memory tasks. To continue to evaluate the model, a version of the 
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categorized list procedure containing a source memory component was necessary. Experiment 3 
was designed for this purpose.    
Chapter 4: Experiment 3 
Experiment 2 was partially consistent with Wixted and Mickes’ (2010) continuous dual-process 
model of signal detection because it showed that confidence correlated with old/new recognition 
accuracy for both remember and know responses. On the other hand, remember old/new 
accuracy was greater than know accuracy when controlling for confidence (see Figure 3.4), and 
the confidence-accuracy correlation was greater for remember responses than know responses, 
two findings not expected given the model. Experiment 3 was designed to investigate the 
relationship between confidence ratings and remember/know/guess judgments in indicating 
source accuracy in addition to old/new recognition accuracy. The prediction made by the 
continuous dual-process model was that remember judgments should provide greater source 
accuracy than know or guess judgments, regardless of the level of confidence provided.   
This pattern is illustrated by the empirical results of Wixted, Mickes, Ingram, and colleagues, 
who found that remember responses made with lower confidence were always higher in source 
accuracy compared to know responses made with higher confidence. In a summary, Ingram et al. 
(2012) wrote (p. 335), “The key finding was that remember judgments made with relatively low 
confidence and low old-new accuracy were consistently associated with higher source accuracy 
than [know] judgments made with higher confidence and higher old-new accuracy.” I sought to 
replicate this finding here. In the categorized list procedure used here, are remember judgments 
made with low confidence consistently associated with higher source accuracy than know 
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judgments?  
The goal of Experiment 3 was to obtain the same general pattern of results obtained by Ingram et 
al. (2012) and characterized in the above quote. To do this, I employed a similar procedure to 
that of Experiment 2, but had subjects study items in different screen positions instead of in the 
center of the screen, as in Experiments 1 and 2. On the recognition test, subjects made both 
old/new recognition decisions and source decisions. They also made confidence ratings and 
provided remember/know/guess judgments (an old/new recognition + source test). Drawing on 
the claims made by the continuous dual-process model, I expected to find the pattern observed in 
Experiment 2 regarding the relationship between confidence and old/new recognition accuracy, 
but I expected a different pattern for the confidence-source accuracy correlation. Specifically, I 
expected to find that judgments assigned remember would be higher in source accuracy 
regardless of confidence rating, when compared to judgments assigned know or guess. Moreover, 
I expected a positive confidence-source accuracy correlation for remember judgments, but a null 
confidence-source accuracy correlation for both know and guess judgments. I predicted this 
because if only remember judgments are assumed to carry (or denote the existence of) sufficient 
source information, knows and guesses should show less variance in source performance and 
thus negligible correlations between confidence and source accuracy. 
4.1 Method 
In Experiment 3, instead of viewing category items in the center of the computer screen, subjects 
studied items that were presented in either the top left or the bottom right of the computer screen. 
Following the study phase, subjects took an old/new recognition + source memory test in which 
they indicated if the test item was old or new and, if old, where they had seen the word presented 
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on the screen. Subjects then rated their confidence in their recognition + source decision using a 
sliding scale and, finally, made remember/know/guess judgments for items called “old.” 
4.1.1 Subjects 
Sixty-four subjects were recruited from the Washington University in St. Louis psychology 
experiment subject pool. There were 22 men and 42 women (mean age = 20.91, SD = 2.51, min 
age = 18, max = 29). Sample size was determined before collecting data using the previous two 
studies as a guide. 
4.1.2 Materials and Design 
Materials (see Appendix A) and counterbalancing procedures were the same as in Experiment 2. 
4.1.3 Procedure 
Like the prior experiments, Experiment 3 consisted of three phases. These were: (1) study, (2) 
distractor, and (3) old/new recognition + source memory test. In the study phase, subjects studied 
the 100 targets in a similar way as did subjects in Experiment 2. In a departure from the 
Experiment 2 procedure, however, five items from each category were selected randomly by the 
computer program to be presented at the top left corner of the computer screen during study, 
whereas the remaining five items were presented at the bottom right corner of the computer 
screen. The order of items appearing in the top left and bottom right was randomized within 
categories. Thus, for each category subjects saw the category name in the center of the screen 
followed by the even or odd response frequency items from that category, presented in random 
order, five in the top left and five in the bottom right.   
The recognition test included two or three sequential steps, depending on how subjects 
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responded: (1) old/new recognition + source decision, (2) confidence rating, and, if necessary, 
(3) remember/know/guess judgment. For each item on the recognition test, subjects chose 
whether the item was: (1) presented at the top left of the screen earlier in the experiment, (2) 
presented in the bottom right, or (3) new (i.e., nonstudied) by clicking one of three buttons on the 
computer screen. Following the old/new recognition + source decision, subjects reported how 
confident they were that their old/new recognition + source decision was correct. Last, subjects 
who responded that the word was presented in the top left or bottom right of the screen during 
the old/new recognition + source decision step made a remember/know/guess judgment for that 
item. 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Probabilities of Remembering, Knowing, and Guessing 
Table 4.1 presents the probabilities that remember, know, and guess judgments were assigned to 
the three different item types on the recognition test, and the confidence with which these ratings 
were assigned. Overall, the table appears similar to the Experiment 2 data presented in Table 3.3. 
That is, remembering was most common for targets, followed by knowing and guessing, whereas 
knowing and guessing were more common for lures than remembering was. In general, subjects 
responded “old” more often to targets than related lures and unrelated lures. 
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Table 4.1: Probabilities of remembering, knowing, and guessing for the three item types in Experiment 3, 
as well as confidence ratings provided with those responses. Standard errors of the mean are presented in 
parentheses. 
 Remember  Know  Guess 
Item 
Type Proportion Confidence 
 Proportion Confidence  Proportion Confidence 
Targets .42 (.02) 78 (2)  .25 (.01) 55 (2)  .11 (.01) 34 (2) 
Related 
Lures .07 (.01) 62 (3) 
 .17 (.02) 46 (2)  .17 (.01) 33 (2) 
Unrelated 
Lures .03 (.01) 49 (4) 
 .06 (.01) 44 (3)  .07 (.01) 30 (2) 
 
A 3 (item type: target, related lure, unrelated lure) x 3 (response type: remember/know/guess) 
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on response proportion, revealing a significant 
interaction, F(4, 252) = 96.39, p < .001, η2p = .61. Tests of simple main effects and subsequent 
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons holding item type constant detected more 
remembering than knowing and more knowing than guessing for targets, but less remembering 
than either knowing and guessing for both related and unrelated lures – the same patterns shown 
in Experiments 1 and 2. Holding response type constant, remembering and knowing were most 
common for targets, then related lures, then unrelated lures. Guess responses were more 
frequently assigned to related lures than the other two item types (all significant Fs > 6.76, all 
significant ps < .003). 
To investigate differences in confidence, a 3 (item type: target, related lure, unrelated lure) x 3 
(response type: remember/know/guess) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on 
confidence rating, revealing a significant interaction, F(4, 88) = 10.91, p < .001, η2p = .33. Tests 
of simple main effects and subsequent Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons holding item 
type constant revealed greater confidence in remember responses on average than know 
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responses, and greater confidence for knows than guesses. The same pattern occurred for related 
lures. For unrelated lures, know and guess confidence was significantly lower than remember 
confidence. These patterns are consistent with the results of Experiment 2. Holding response 
type constant, both remembers and knows to targets were more confident on average than 
remembers and knows to related lures, and those were more confident than remembers and 
knows to unrelated lures. Meanwhile, confidence in guesses was greater for both targets and 
related lures than it was for unrelated lures (all significant Fs > 6.18, all significant ps < .004). 
These findings all conform generally to previous results. In the categorized list procedure, targets 
receive remembers and lures receive knows and guesses. Remembers to targets were assigned the 
highest confidence ratings, whereas guesses to unrelated lures received the lowest confidence. 
Subjects appeared to respond in Experiment 3 in a similar way as they did in Experiments 1 
(with respect to response rates) and Experiment 2 (with respect to response rates and confidence 
ratings). 
4.2.2 Old/New Recognition Accuracy 
Figure 4.1 depicts the confidence-old/new recognition accuracy relationship using a calibration 
plot. It is interesting to see that overall calibration has improved even further (compare to Figure 
3.3) – for related lures, confidence ratings over 50 are reasonably appropriate for the resulting 
level of accuracy. It is possible that having subjects make source decisions (or providing access 
to additional source information like screen position) decreased the likelihood of high confidence 
errors to related lures further. Perhaps when presented with a deceptive related lure on the 
screen, subjects were unable to recollect screen position and thus were more likely to respond 
correctly “new.” In fact, subjects are more accurate than they expect to be for all item types at 
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the lower end of the confidence scale (i.e., exhibiting underconfidence), which can be attributed 
to the “easy” component of the hard-easy effect. 
 
Figure 4.1: Calibration in Experiment 3 as a function of item type. Error bars show the 95% confidence 
interval of the mean. The number of observations are presented beside each point. 
I also constructed calibration plots to investigate the relation between confidence and accuracy 
for memories that were judged remember, know, and guess, in the same way shown in Figure 
3.4. These calibration plots are shown in Figure 4.2. As expected, Figure 3.4 and Figure 4.2 
appear very similar. Subjects made remember, know, and guess judgments with all levels of 
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confidence (although, intuitively, high confidence knows and low confidence remembers are 
rarer). 
Responses assigned higher confidence were more likely to be correct than response assigned 
lower confidence. Moreover, for a given level of confidence, remember judgments were more 
accurate than know judgments, and know judgments more accurate than guesses. The similarities 
between these two figures suggest that adding a source component to the memory task did not 
greatly change the confidence-accuracy relationship for remember/know/guess judgments, and 
confirm the findings of Experiment 2. 
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Figure 4.2: Old/new calibration in Experiment 3 for responses assigned remember, know, and guess 
judgments. Error bars show the 95% confidence interval of the mean. The number of observations are 
presented beside each point. 
4.2.3 Source Accuracy 
Because I collected source memory decisions in addition to old/new recognition judgments, I 
was also able to investigate the relationship between confidence and source accuracy as a 
function of remember/know/guess judgment. These data are shown in Figure 4.3. Surprisingly, 
these data follow the same pattern as the old/new recognition data do (as shown in Figure 3.4 for 
the prior experiment and Figure 4.2 for the current one). Specifically, source accuracy increased 
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with confidence, and remembers were more accurate than knows, and knows more than guesses. 
 
Figure 4.3: Source calibration in Experiment 3 for responses assigned remember, know, and guess 
judgments. Error bars show the 95% confidence interval of the mean. The number of observations are the 
same as those depicted in Figure 4.2. 
The results depicted in Figure 4.3 are surprising considering the account provided by Wixted and 
Mickes (2010), who observed that remember responses with lower confidence were higher in 
source accuracy than know responses provided with higher confidence. This figure shows, 
however, that average source accuracy of remember responses of, say, 40-59 confidence – on 
average .38 correct – was clearly lower than source accuracy of know responses of 80-100 
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confidence – on average .61 correct. In fact, know responses of 80-100 confidence – of which 
411 occurred in the study (comprising almost 20% of high confidence responses) – were higher 
in source accuracy than remember ratings of confidence 0-59. These results also differ from 
those of Ingram and colleagues (2012), who also found that lower confidence remember 
responses were higher in source accuracy than higher confidence know responses (see Figure 1.6, 
panel A). 
Moreover, whereas a ceiling effect for high confidence responses is a potential confound when 
examining old/new recognition accuracy, ceiling effects do not appear to be in play here. Clear 
differences between remembering, knowing, and guessing emerge throughout the range of 
confidence values. Both confidence ratings and remember/know/guess judgments appear to 
predict source accuracy, even when controlling for confidence or controlling for judgment. The 
implications of these results will be described in the Discussion. 
4.2.4 Confidence-Old/New Accuracy Correlations 
As in Experiment 2, I also computed four types of confidence-accuracy correlation for the three 
different item types in the experiment. As Table 4.2 shows, and in agreement with the previous 
figures, confidence and accuracy were correlated regardless of method of analysis. These results 
are different from the results of prior experiments, where the confidence-accuracy correlation for 
related lures was negative or null (and thus agree overall with the calibration plots provided in 
Figure 4.1) – in fact, these are the highest confidence-accuracy correlations that have ever been 
obtained in a variant of the DeSoto and Roediger (2014) categorized list procedure. It is possible 
that asking subjects to make source decisions at the same time as recognition decisions reduced 
the average confidence and accuracy of identifications of related lures, thereby increasing the 
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strength of the confidence-accuracy association between these items. This is also consistent with 
the paper by Mulligan et al. (2010), who found that the remember/know/guess procedure was 
capable of qualitatively changing recognition accuracy. 
Table 4.2: Confidence-old/new accuracy correlations for the three item types in Experiment 3. Between-
units correlations calculated using Pearson r, within-units correlations calculated with Goodman-Kruskal 
γ. *p < .05 **p < .01 
Item Type Between-Subjects Within-Subjects Between-Events Within-Events 
Targets .41** .43** .37** .41** 
Related Lures .31** .19**  .27**  .23** 
Unrelated Lures .53** .45** .52** .53** 
 
Table 4.3 contains the correlations between confidence and accuracy for memories that were 
judged remember, know, and guess. Compare this table to Table 3.3. The two tables are 
consistent in showing that the confidence-accuracy association is significantly positive for both 
remember and know judgments. Here, though, only the between-events guess correlation is 
positive (although only barely so, explaining just 4% of the variance in accuracy). Again, overall, 
the confidence-accuracy association was stronger in this experiment than in the previous one. 
Table 4.3: Confidence-old/new accuracy correlations for remembered, known, and guessed memories in 
Experiment 3. Between-units correlations calculated using Pearson r, within-units correlations calculated 
with Goodman-Kruskal γ. *p < .05 **p < .01 
 Between-Subjects Within-Subjects Between-Events Within-Events 
Remember -.76** -.45** -.56** -.62** 
Know -.45** -.28** -.13** -.30** 
Guess -.02**  -.05**  -.21**  -.01**  
 
I examined differences in the confidence-accuracy correlation as a function of remember versus 
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know judgment, as I did in Experiment 2. Here, a difference was detected between between-
subjects remember and know judgments, as calculated by a Fisher r-to-z test (z = 2.82, p = .005). 
A difference was also detected for the between-events correlation (z = 4.98, p < .001). This 
means that according to the two between-units methods of analysis, the confidence-accuracy 
correlation was stronger for remember responses than know responses. 
In terms of within-subjects or within-events analyses, significant differences were obtained 
between remember and know judgments for both within-subjects (paired-samples t[53] = 2.41, p 
= .02) and within-events analyses (t[164] = 8.83, p < .001). According to these types of analysis, 
the remember confidence-accuracy correlations were stronger than the know confidence-
accuracy correlations. These differences emerge even despite potential restriction of range issues 
that may occur for remembers (in which, on average, subjects are highly confident and accurate). 
Thus, differences in the confidence-accuracy correlation were detected across all four types of 
analysis as a function of remember versus know judgment.  
4.2.5 Confidence-Source Accuracy Correlations 
Because Experiment 3 collected source memory decisions in addition to old/new decisions, the 
correlation between confidence and source accuracy can also be computed. This calculation is 
not possible as a function of item type (since any response of “old” to a related lure or unrelated 
lure is, by definition, incorrect). These correlations can be computed for remember, know, and 
guess judgments, however. 
These correlations are contained in Table 4.4. This table shows that the correlation between 
confidence and source accuracy are positive for both remember and know judgments regardless 
of method of analysis, but not significantly different for guesses (at least in three of the four 
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methods of analysis). 
Table 4.4: Confidence-source accuracy correlations for remembered, known, and guessed memories in 
Experiment 3. Between-units correlations calculated using Pearson r, within-units correlations calculated 
with Goodman-Kruskal γ. *p < .05 **p < .01 
 Between-Subjects Within-Subjects Between-Events Within-Events 
Remember .78** .44** .59** .56** 
Know .57** .30** .24** .33** 
Guess .01**  .03**  .09**  .03**  
 
Statistical differences were found between remember and know correlations for all four types of 
analysis. The between-subjects Fisher r-to-z test was significant  (z = 2.20, p = .03) as was the 
between-events test (z = 4.30, p < .001). Significant differences were also obtained between 
remember and know judgments for both within-subjects (paired-samples t[60] = 2.38, p = .02) 
and within-events analyses (t[194] = 6.80, p < .001). These results show that the confidence-
accuracy relationship for remember responses was stronger than the relationship for know 
responses in Experiment 3 – thus, when an individual is remembering, increases in confidence 
are more indicative of increases in accuracy than when an individual is knowing.  
Figure 4.4 shows the between-events confidence-source accuracy plot for remember, know, and 
guess judgments. This figure appears similar to the plot shown for old/new accuracy in 
Experiment 2 (see Figure 3.5).  
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Figure 4.4: The between-events confidence-source accuracy plot for remembered, known, and guessed 
items. Each point represents the average confidence assigned to an item and the average source accuracy 
of that item. Linear trendlines are included. 
Last, logistic regression analyses are shown in Appendix C. 
4.3 Discussion 
Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiments 1 and 2. Similar proportions of remembering, 
knowing, and guessing were found to the three different item types among studies, suggesting 
that more recollection, as indicated by remember responses, was present for targets than for lures 
(and the inverse – that knowing and guessing were more common for lures). As in prior studies, 
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confidence ratings mirrored these response probabilities – on average, remembers to targets were 
responded to with greater confidence than guesses to related lures, for example. These results are 
one illustration of a general relation between confidence and remember/know/guess judgments. 
Additionally, Experiment 3 found that responses assigned remember were higher in old/new 
accuracy than responses assigned know, and that know responses were higher in old/new 
accuracy than responses assigned guess (shown in Figure 4.2). This was also consistent with 
prior studies, although not predicted by the continuous dual-process model. The confidence-
old/new accuracy correlations also agreed with the results of Experiment 2.  
The critical findings of Experiment 3, however, were the source memory results. A critical tenet 
of the continuous dual-process model is that source accuracy for remember responses should, on 
average, be greater than source accuracy for know responses, regardless of the level of 
confidence provided. Contrary to this prediction, Experiment 3 found that lower confidence 
remembers were lower in source accuracy than higher confidence knows, however (see Figure 
4.3). Moreover, although the confidence-source accuracy correlation was greater for remember 
responses, the correlation for know responses was still significantly positive, an indication of an 
association between strength of knowing and source accuracy.  
Why did this study fail to replicate the predictions of the continuous dual-process model? Before 
turning to theoretical reasons, a straightforward possibility was that the way that the different 
judgments were collected in Experiment 3 influenced the results. Perhaps it was the case that 
asking for a recognition decision and a source decision simultaneously, using three buttons, led 
to a pattern of results that differed from previous studies exploring the continuous dual-process 
model. To eliminate this possibility, I conducted Experiment 4, in which I had subjects make 
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old/new recognition decisions and source decisions separately and also collected confidence 
separately for each of these decisions. Additionally, I had subjects make these judgments in 
different orders for the purpose of exploring effects of order on results. 
Chapter 5: Experiment 4 
Experiment 3 showed that confidence correlated with both old/new accuracy as well as source 
accuracy, and that for a given level of confidence, a remember judgment was likely to be 
associated with both higher old/new and source accuracy than a know judgment assigned the 
same level of confidence. This finding was inconsistent with the continuous dual-process model 
(Wixted & Mickes, 2010), and I was concerned that the order and manner in which judgments 
were collected affected the pattern of the results. In Experiment 3, subjects made old/new 
recognition + source decisions, then rated confidence for that combined decision, then made 
remember/know/guess judgments. Perhaps it was the case that the combination of judgments or 
order led subjects to make confidence ratings based on the old/new component of the old/new 
recognition + source decision, completely ignoring any confidence experienced for the source 
decision component.  
To test for order effects, I conducted a replication of Experiment 3 in which order of judgments 
was manipulated. In this experiment, subjects made old/new recognition decisions, old/new 
recognition confidence ratings, source memory decisions, source confidence ratings, and 
remember/know/guess judgments for each item on the test – one additional judgment for each 
“new” item, and four additional judgments (confidence) for each item called “old.” Additionally, 
I designed four different experimental groups in which the order of ratings was counterbalanced. 
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If the simultaneous old/new recognition + source decision step was affecting the results, the 
prediction was that collecting judgments sequentially would produce data consistent with Wixted 
and Mickes’ (2010) findings. (A condition most similar to Wixted and Mickes’ study would 
have, for each item, collected an old/new recognition decision with a confidence rating, followed 
by a remember/know/guess judgment, followed by a source memory decision.) On the other 
hand, if order and manner of judgments did not have an effect, I expected results to replicate the 
previous findings.   
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Subjects 
Ninety-six subjects were recruited from the Washington University in St. Louis psychology 
experiment subject pool. There were 37 men, 58 women, and one subject who selected 
“other/prefer not to respond” when asked about gender (mean age = 20.13, SD = 2.18, min age = 
18, max = 27).  
5.1.2 Materials and Design 
Materials were the same as in Experiment 3 (see Appendix A). 
5.1.3 Procedure 
In Experiment 4, subjects were assigned randomly to one of four experimental groups; see 
Figure 5.1 for an illustration of the groups. Twenty-four subjects participated in each group. All 
groups studied categorized items in the same way that subjects did in Experiment 3 – category by 
category, with items appearing in one of two screen corners. The test was different for each 
group, however. These four groups will be defined by letters and descriptive labels. 
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Figure 5.1: An illustration of the four conditions in Experiment 4. 
In Group A, the all old/new-source-RKG group, subjects made old/new recognition decisions, 
followed by 0-100 old/new confidence ratings, for each of the 300 items on the test. Following 
this, subjects were presented with the items to which they responded “old,” presented in another 
random order. For each of these items, subjects made a source decision (clicking either the 
“upper left” or “bottom right” button) followed by a source confidence rating on a scale from 0-
100, then a remember/know/guess judgment for the word. 
In Group B, the sequential old/new-source-RKG group, subjects made all of the judgments 
sequentially: for each item, an old/new recognition decision, an old/new confidence rating, and 
then, if the item was called “old,” a source decision, a source confidence rating, and a 
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remember/know/guess judgment. The procedure then continued for the second item.  
Subjects in Group C, the all old/new-RKG-source group, proceeded like subjects in the first 
group, but after making old/new recognition decisions and confidence ratings for all words, 
subjects made remember/know/guess judgments followed by source decisions and source 
confidence ratings for all items called old. The difference between Group A and Group C was 
that in Group C, the remember/know/guess judgment preceded the source decision and 
confidence rating, rather than followed them. 
Those in Group D, called the sequential old/new-RKG-source group, for each item made old/new 
recognition decisions, old/new confidence ratings, and, for items called “old,” 
remember/know/guess judgments, source decisions, then source confidence ratings. The 
procedure for Group D differed from that for Group B in that remember/know/guess judgments 
preceded source decisions, rather than followed them. This is the condition that most closely 
resembles Wixted and Mickes’ (2010) method. 
Thus, in all of these groups judgments were sequential and thus the basis for confidence ratings 
was either old/new decision or source decision alone, rather than both, as it was in Experiment 3. 
The four conditions tested separately whether having the remember/know/guess judgment prior 
to or after source decision would affect the results, and also whether making all old/new 
decisions prior to source decisions influenced results. 
5.2 Results 
The purpose of the four groups tested in Experiment 4 was to determine whether the order of 
judgments affected the relationship between old/new confidence and old/new accuracy or the 
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relationship between source confidence and source accuracy. Specifically, I was expecting that 
separating the judgments would mirror what Wixted and Mickes (2010) reported for source 
memory: An instance where remember responses were always higher in source accuracy than 
know responses, regardless of the level of confidence assigned. To foreshadow, none of the four 
groups demonstrated this pattern. 
5.2.1 Old/New Recognition Accuracy 
Figure 5.2 shows the relation between old/new accuracy and confidence as a function of 
remember, know, and guess judgment. The results are somewhat noisy, due to limited numbers 
of observations in some cells, especially at the lower ranges of the confidence scale (24 subjects 
are represented in each calibration plot here, compared to 64 in previous studies). Nevertheless, 
all of these figures echo the same gestalt: Old/new accuracy increased with confidence ratings 
for memories marked remember, know, and, to a lesser extent, guess. These patterns were also 
found in Figure 3.4 and Figure 4.2, which show the corresponding analyses conducted for the 
previous experiments. 
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Figure 5.2: Old/new accuracy as a function of old/new confidence in Experiment 4 for responses assigned 
remember, know, and guess judgments.  
Some slight qualitative differences between groups exist. For instance, for Groups A and C, there 
were no significant differences between remember and know judgments, in terms of old/new 
accuracy, at the highest portions of the scale. This difference did appear in panels B and D, 
however. Because of a lack of observation in some subjects’ cells (e.g., only about half the 
sample reported any low confidence knows and remembers), overall ANOVAs could not be 
conducted on these calibration curves (and those following). In lieu of an ANOVA, I used a 
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targeted comparison looking at differences between remember and know recognition accuracy at 
the 80-100 confidence level. This analysis identified a statistically significant difference in 
Group B, paired-samples t(23) = 4.98, p < .001, and a marginally significant difference in Group 
D, t(22) = 1.99, p = .059. This comparison was nonsignificant in the other two groups. (T-tests 
will be used similarly in subsequent analyses.) 
These figures and t-tests show that no differences in old/new accuracy between remember and 
know were found at high levels of confidence (80-100) when all old/new judgments were made 
before source and recognition judgments (Groups A and C), but when judgments were made 
sequentially (Groups B and D), an advantage for remembering emerged. 
This pattern fits with the continuous dual-process model. When individuals were unconcerned 
about making remember/know/guess judgments and source decisions when making old/new 
recognition decisions, as they were in Groups A and C, confidence tracked with accuracy to the 
same degree regardless of eventual remember/know/guess judgment. This is consistent with the 
idea that confidence ratings pick up an aggregate of recollection and familiarity and correlate 
with recognition accuracy. 
In Groups B and D, however, the addition of the remember/know/guess judgment for each item 
may have encouraged subjects to think about source details, integrating a larger recollection 
component or emphasis into their old/new decisions. Therefore, these results may indicate that 
although the continuous dual-process model predicts equal accuracy between remember and 
know, the reason that this result does not always appear may be due to methodological 
differences. Perhaps having to complete remember/know/guess judgments or make source 
decisions puts subjects into a type of retrieval mode where even old/new responses and 
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confidence ratings are based on episodic or contextual information. 
5.2.2 Source Accuracy 
Figure 5.3 shows calibration between source confidence ratings and source accuracy as a 
function of remember/know/guess judgment.   
 
Figure 5.3: Source accuracy as a function of source confidence in Experiment 4 for responses assigned 
remember, know, and guess judgments. 
Again, the patterns shown in this figure generally resemble those in Figure 5.3 (and thus also 
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Figure 4.3). Source confidence tracks with source accuracy for all groups, and high confidence 
know responses are higher in source accuracy than lower confidence remember responses. To 
confirm this finding statistically, I compared source accuracy for the 80-100 confidence know 
responses to source accuracy for 60-79 confidence remember responses. Averaging across 
subjects and using a one-tailed paired-samples t-test, expecting an advantage for lower 
confidence remembering over higher confidence knowing, I found no significant advantage of 
remembering, p > .05. 
Here, Group B appears different from the others due to the relatively large discrepancy in source 
accuracy at the higher ends of the source confidence scale, with source accuracy for remember 
judgments being higher than source accuracy for knows. This was confirmed with a paired-
samples t-test that showed that remember source accuracy (M = 90) was significantly greater 
than know source accuracy (M = 57) at the 80-100 confidence level, t(15) = 3.74, p = .002 (this 
comparison for the other three groups was nonsignificant). Subjects in this group made 
remember/know/guess judgments after making source decisions, so it is possible that subjects 
were more likely to respond remember if they were able to recollect the correct screen location. 
This behavior would accentuate differences between remember and know judgments. This 
difference did not arise for Group A, however, in which subjects also made source decisions 
before remember/know/guess judgments. The two-round procedure used for Group A, with all 
old/new judgments made first, may have set it apart from Group B. Perhaps the differences in 
Group B (compared to Group A) were due to source confidence ratings being closer in time to 
old/new recognition decisions and old/new recognition confidence ratings, and thus responding 
was influenced by the old/new signal. 
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In the two previous figures, I showed that old/new confidence relates to old/new accuracy and 
source confidence relates to source accuracy for both remember and know judgments. Is there a 
relationship between old/new confidence and eventual source decision accuracy? To investigate, 
I created a third calibration plot showing the relationship between old/new confidence and source 
accuracy. This plot is depicted in Figure 5.4. Clearly, the general pattern shown here is the same 
as the ones shown in other figures: an association between confidence and accuracy regardless of 
remember/know/guess judgment. As in the prior analysis, however, no groups show better source 
memory for lower confidence (60-79) remember judgments compared to higher confidence (80-
100) knows. On the other hand, though, greater differences between remember and know 
judgments in predicting accuracy appear in Groups B and D at the highest levels of confidence 
(80-100). This different was significant, averaging across subjects, for both Group B, paired-
samples t(23) = 4.77, p < .001, and Group D, t(21) = 2.59, p = .017. These results again show 
potential differences in responding that occur when subjects focus only on making old/new 
recognition decisions before making remember/know/guess judgments and source decisions – 
Groups A and C show a somewhat different pattern from B and D when responding with high 
confidence. 
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Figure 5.4: Source accuracy as a function of old/new confidence in Experiment 4 for responses assigned 
remember, know, and guess judgments. 
5.2.3 Confidence-Accuracy Correlations 
I also calculated the correlations between old/new confidence and old/new accuracy, source 
confidence and source accuracy, and old/new confidence and source accuracy. For descriptive 
purposes, I have included these correlations in Appendix D.  
In general, these correlations show that the strength of the confidence-accuracy association is 
greatest for targets, less for unrelated lures, and weakest for related lures, which agrees with 
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previous data (DeSoto & Roediger, 2014). More importantly, however, is that both remember 
and know responses show positive associations between old/new recognition accuracy and 
confidence and source accuracy and confidence. In general, however, this correlation is greater 
for remember judgments than know judgments. Across the 24 comparisons shown in Appendix 
D, the confidence-accuracy correlation was greater for remember than know 20 times. (Twice, 
there was no difference, and twice, there was a know advantage.) These results are significant by 
sign test, p < .01.  
These results mean that confidence was positively associated with accuracy regardless of 
whether a subject was in a state of remembering or a state of knowing. This association was 
consistent across type of test, too – old/new recognition versus source. Again, the continuous 
dual-process model does not make an explicit statement about the confidence-accuracy 
correlation as a function of remember/know/guess, but according to my interpretation it was 
expected that the correlation for remembering and knowing would be equal on an old/new task 
and that there would be a significant correlation for remembering but not knowing on a source 
task. These predictions had slight support from the data – the four cases showing no remember 
advantage in the sign test occurred for old/new confidence and accuracy, and all remember 
correlations were greater than know correlations for source – but further research will need to 
explore the continuous dual-process model’s implications for confidence-accuracy correlations 
to evaluate these findings further.  
Last, logistic regression analyses are included in Appendix C. 
5.3 Discussion 
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In Experiment 4, subjects were presented with categorized items and given a recognition test 
where they were required to make old/new recognition decisions, rate old/new confidence, make 
source decisions, rate source confidence, and also provide remember/know/guess judgments. 
Moreover, four groups of subjects made these ratings in different orders. The aim of the study 
was to determine if rating order affected the general pattern of results found in Experiments 1, 2, 
and 3. 
Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3, and Figure 5.4 convincingly show that the relationship between 
confidence and both kinds of accuracy (old/new and source) was consistently positive (i.e., 
increasing) for remember and know judgments. Whether accuracy is different or equal for a 
given level of confidence as a function of remember/know/guess judgment varied somewhat 
between experimental groups, but the most important finding was that high confidence memories 
were higher in accuracy than lower confidence memories. These patterns, unexpectedly, emerged 
for both old/new recognition and source decisions.   
Chapter 6: General Discussion 
The four experiments reported in this dissertation explore the relationship between old/new 
recognition memory, source memory, confidence ratings, and remember/know/guess judgments. 
The purpose was to ground confidence-accuracy research using deceptive and nondeceptive 
materials into a theoretical framework and to assess confidence ratings and 
remember/know/guess judgments as indicators of recognition accuracy.  
6.1 Summary of Findings 
In Experiment 1, I showed that remember/know/guess judgments are valid indicators of the 
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accuracy of recognition decisions in the DeSoto and Roediger (2014) categorized list procedure. 
Subjects were likely to assign remember judgments to targets, but they less frequently assigned 
them to related or unrelated lures. Similar patterns of responding occurred regardless of whether 
items were presented via auditory or visual modalities. Additionally, this experiment showed that 
correct recognition was more likely for items of lower response frequency, but that false 
recognition was more likely for items of higher frequency, replicating previous research (e.g., 
Dewhurst, 2001). These findings suggest important differences between false memories arising 
in categorized versus associative procedures and also contribute to the discussion of modality 
effects and how and when they arise, showing that the modality effect, which obtains in the 
DRM paradigm, does not extend to categorized lists. Additionally, Experiment 1 also set up the 
subsequent experiments. 
In Experiment 2, I combined both confidence ratings and remember/know/guess judgments and 
showed that both make unique contributions to predicting the accuracy of old/new recognition 
judgments. Specifically, high confidence remember responses were more likely to be accurate 
than any other type of response, suggesting that confidence ratings and remember/know/guess 
judgments may be additive in terms of their predictive capability. This experiment also applied 
confidence-accuracy analyses to remember, know, and guess judgments and observed that 
confidence and accuracy correlate in states of remembering and knowing, but that the correlation 
is stronger when remembering. Confidence did not correlate with accuracy when subjects were 
guessing. 
In Experiment 3, I tested subjects’ old/new recognition memory but also their source memory, as 
well, and found that old/new recognition memory and source memory showed similar 
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relationships with confidence and remember/know/guess judgments, an unexpected result. It was 
predicted that all remember responses would show better source accuracy than know and guess 
responses, but this did not occur. Rather, in Experiment 3 remember responses were more 
accurate than know responses when controlling for confidence in predicting both old/new 
recognition and source accuracy. In Experiment 4, a replication and extension of Experiment 3, I 
found that these patterns were similar regardless of the order or manner in which judgments were 
made. 
Several conclusions implications arise from these data. First, at least in this procedure with these 
materials, a rememberer ought to trust high confidence memories over memories held with lower 
confidence. Second, a rememberer ought to trust recognition decisions based on the experience 
of remembering more than those based on knowing or guessing. Third, recognition accompanied 
by high confidence and remembering are likely to be most accurate of all – these responses, on 
average, were 90% likely to be correct, even with somewhat deceptive materials. These patterns 
are similar for old/new memory as well as source memory. 
Although the data here are only partially consistent with the continuous dual-process model – to 
be discussed in the following section – they suggest that confidence and remember/know/guess 
judgments have utility when used jointly. Why are such procedures used so infrequently within 
the literature? It is likely that an implicit single-process view – that confidence and 
remember/know/guess index the same thing (e.g., Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004) – remains 
popular with many memory researchers. Surprisingly, though, evidence against this perspective 
dates as far back as Rajaram’s (1993) foundational work on the remember/know/guess procedure 
(and is found in the work of others; e.g., Dobbins, Kroll, & Yonelinas, 2004). Other models of 
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signal detection, which assume that recollection is a dichotomous process (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002) 
likewise predict that all remembering occurs with high confidence, and thus it is of less interest 
to examine how confidence varies within remember responses (only within knows). 
Collecting both confidence ratings and remember/know/guess judgments in the same procedure 
allowed the computation of confidence-accuracy correlations for memories that are remembered, 
known, or guessed, for the first time. My research suggests that confidence is associated with 
accuracy when a rememberer is in a state of remembering or knowing (as compared to guessing). 
In most cases, the confidence-accuracy association is stronger when subjects are remembering 
compared to when they are knowing. It is possible that this occurs because recollection is more 
likely to support accurate retrieval than familiarity is, especially when dealing with the 
combination of deceptive and nondeceptive items present on the test in this procedure (and not 
present in the original continuous dual-process research using unrelated word lists). When 
unrelated words are on the test, it is perhaps not as necessary to rely on recollection when 
responding – familiarity will do. 
One way of thinking about this state of affairs might be as follows. If remembering and knowing 
combine to support old/new recognition performance, and both are indexed by confidence, one 
would expect no differences between remembering and knowing in the confidence-accuracy 
relation. If the base rates of accuracy of remembering and knowing are different, however, this 
relationship may be altered. Namely, using unrelated materials, remembering and knowing may 
be roughly similar in terms of predicting accuracy (i.e., similar base rates of accuracy). In 
contrast, using category materials, as in the current experiments, remembering may be more 
likely to support accurate retrieval than knowing. Thus, the relative weights of remembering and 
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knowing would differ in their contribution to predicting accuracy. Perhaps individuals do not 
account for these weights when combining recollection and familiarity signals in old/new 
recognition. 
In sum, our results suggest that when deciding whether to trust our memories, we should 
consider our confidence, our qualitative sense of remembering (remember/know/guess), and 
perhaps even how these experiences vary from context to context. To return to the original 
example, this research suggests that an eyewitness choosing an individual from a lineup ought to 
consult both the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of his or her memory. If the 
rememberer is confident that the individual committed the crime, and can also recollect episodic 
characteristics of how the crime unfolded, an identification may be reasonable. A lack of either 
confidence or remembering, however, suggests that the identification should be more tentative. 
6.2 Evaluating the Continuous Dual-Process Model 
The results reported in this dissertation provide mixed support for the continuous dual-process 
model of remember/know/guess judgments, proposed by Wixted and Mickes (2010). Applying 
the model to the data presented here, I expected the following findings: (1) evidence of 
recollection as a continuous process, (2) greater recognition accuracy for higher compared to 
lower confidence responses, (3) greater recognition accuracy for remember responses than know 
responses, and knows than guesses, (4) equivalent recognition accuracy as a function of 
remember and know judgment when controlling for confidence, and (5) higher source accuracy 
for remembers than knows, regardless of confidence. Across the four experiments reported here, 
I found support for points (1), (2), and (3), but not for (4) and (5). I go through these expectations 
in turn. 
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First, the idea that recollection is a continuous process is supported by the observation that 
subjects assigned varying levels of confidence ratings to remember responses. This finding was 
shown consistently across Experiments 2 (Figure 3.4), 3 (Figure 4.2), and 4. Note the 
observation counts labeled in each figure. In these experiments, subjects appeared to experience 
different levels of recollection, which were indexed by different confidence ratings. One question 
that arises, however, is what proportion of low confidence remember responses must appear in a 
dataset to support this conclusion – in other words, one could point to the large majority of high 
confidence remembers as evidence that recollection is dichotomous (as maintained by Yonelinas, 
2002). 
Second, Experiments 2, 3, and 4 all found that recognition accuracy was greater for higher 
relative to lower confidence responses, on average. When remember, know, and guess judgments 
and item types are grouped together, this pattern is clear (although differences in this relationship 
as a function of remember/know/guess judgment and item type emerged). These findings are 
consistent with the continuous dual-process model, which suggests that confidence is, on 
average, an indicator of the sum of familiarity and recollection, and is thereby an indicator of 
old/new recognition accuracy. The two exceptions to this generalization are guess responses – 
for which confidence is not associated with accuracy – and highly related items – for which 
confidence and accuracy are weakly associated (and sometimes not associated or even negatively 
associated; DeSoto & Roediger, 2014). 
Third, across all experiments, differences in old/new recognition accuracy were shown as a 
function of remember, know, and guess judgment. Perhaps intuitively, remember responses were 
more accurate than knows, and knows more accurate than guesses. This finding is also in support 
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of the continuous dual-process model, which states that on average, remember ratings should be 
more accurate (but also greater in confidence) than know responses (which are also lower in 
confidence, on average).  
Past this point, however, my findings diverge from the predictions of the continuous dual-
process model. Wixted and Mickes (2010) predicted that when confidence is controlled for (i.e., 
given a particular level of confidence), remember responses should have the same old/new 
accuracy as know responses. In all the cases reported in this dissertation, however, remember 
accuracy was greater than know accuracy when controlling for level of confidence. Despite the 
claims of the model, this pattern also appears in several of Wixted and Mickes (2010) and 
Ingram et al.’s (2012) studies, as well. Wixted and Mickes warn that under certain conditions, 
“Equating for confidence would not necessarily equate for strength... equating for old/new 
accuracy in addition to equating for old/new confidence is helpful in this regard” (p. 1048). I did 
not equate for old/new accuracy in these dissertation experiments because the initial goal was to 
extend the DeSoto and Roediger (2014) categorized list procedure directly. Further tests of the 
continuous dual-process model using the categorized list procedure will require an attempt to 
equate for old/new accuracy (or at a minimum, additional consideration of this issue).  
Second, and more concerning, my experiments failed to find a remember advantage over knows 
for source memory accuracy when confidence ratings of 40 or higher were assigned. These 
findings were shown in Experiment 3 (and seen in Figure 4.3) and Experiment 4 (Figure 5.3). In 
Experiment 3, subjects were asked to click a button that said “top left,” “bottom right,” or “new,” 
then make a confidence rating, when making old/new recognition + source decisions. I was 
concerned that this hybrid judgment was leading subjects to integrate both old/new signal as well 
 122 
as source signal into their confidence ratings. In Experiment 4, I attempted to eliminate this 
potential confound by making all of the judgments sequential and also counterbalancing where 
possible with the purpose of examining whether differences in judgment order led to differences 
in patterns of results. All four experimental groups, however, failed to show an advantage of 
lower confidence remembers over higher confidence knows in terms of source memory, a critical 
finding of the Wixted and Mickes (2010) and Ingram et al. (2012) papers. 
Why this discrepancy? As mentioned earlier, the experiments reported here did not equate for 
old/new accuracy as well as old/new confidence. It is unclear how the patterns of results would 
differ if old/new accuracy were equated, but it is likely that the differences would be quantitative 
rather than qualitative – that is, the slopes of the remember and know lines in Figure 4.3 and 
Figure 5.3 would not differ. If this were the case, however, the finding reported here would be 
even more pronounced. The Ingram et al. (2012) study was conducted in the interest of equating 
for old/new accuracy – this was the original purpose of the unusual scale used – but in some 
ways, the use of this unusual scale introduces as many issues as it solves. When subjects respond 
using the Ingram et al. (2012) scale, for instance, are they doing so in ways that parallel decision-
making in standard recognition procedures? Additionally, it seems unusual for the theory to state 
that recollection and familiarity occur in tandem but then ask subjects to make a dichotomous 
judgment as to whether remembering or knowing is being experienced. 
The possibility also exists that the instructions used in this experiment somehow led subjects to 
make confidence ratings and remember/know/guess judgments differently than they did in 
Wixted and Mickes (2010) and Ingram et al. (2012). Geraci and colleagues examined the 
influence of remember/know instructions on task performance in several papers (e.g., Geraci & 
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McCabe, 2006; Geraci, McCabe, & Guillory, 2009; McCabe & Geraci, 2009), and found that the 
wording of the remember/know instructions affected responding. Specifically, when instructions 
emphasized that know responses should also be high in confidence, standard remember/know 
patterns emerged, revealing different qualitative effects of remembering (i.e., a dissociation for 
different types of items; see Geraci et al., 2009). When instructions did not emphasize that 
knowing should necessarily be highly confident, however, remember/know responses appeared 
similar in nature to confidence ratings. In these experiments, confidence language was purposely 
removed from the remember/know/guess instructions so that remembering and knowing could be 
reported with different levels of confidence. This methodological decision may have had the 
counterintuitive side effect of making remember/know/guess judgments more similar to 
confidence ratings than they would have been otherwise. 
In sum, the experiments reported here only partially agree with the continuous dual-process 
model. Additional research will be necessary to continue evaluating this model and how the 
present results fit, or do not fit, with its claims. Again, the first step will be an attempt to equate 
for old/new accuracy and confidence together. Wixted and Mickes (2010) caution that if the two 
have not been equated, “Conclusions should probably be tempered accordingly” (p. 1048).  
6.3 Implications of Quantitative and Qualitative Indicators 
The findings here suggest that there could be some benefit to training individuals to be sensitive 
to qualitative indicators of recognition accuracy when making memory decisions. Some research 
has found success in teaching rememberers, mostly older adults, to rely on recollection (Castel, 
2007) or even attempting to improve recollection directly (Jennings & Jacoby, 2003). Improving 
sensitivity to recollection while engaging in metacognitive monitoring could be another path to 
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the same result. 
A potential intervention would be to ask individuals to attempt to retrieve and evaluate source 
memory when making memory decisions, with the understanding that the conjunction of high 
confidence and retrieval of source details may indicate higher accuracy. This idea is supported 
by the results of Experiment 2 (and Experiment 1, in a sense), which found that asking subjects 
to make remember/know/guess judgments eliminated the negative confidence-accuracy 
correlation for related lures, and by Experiments 3 and 4, which showed that asking subjects to 
make remember/know/guess judgments and source memory decisions improved these 
correlations further.  
These benefits may extend outside of the laboratory to real-world scenarios. In the courtroom, if 
a witness expresses high confidence in an identification and is also able to retrieve source details, 
perhaps a judge or jury should be swayed to a greater degree than if high confidence were 
expressed alone. Likewise, in the classroom, retrieving details of the original encoding episode 
may indicate that the sense of high confidence is likely due to the rich memory for that episode 
compared to familiarity driven by an event occurring outside of the classroom.  
Of course, certain situations do arise where high confidence remember responses turn out to be 
false (Arndt, 2012; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). At the very least, these types of errors are 
almost certainly less frequent than high confidence or remember errors alone. Future research 
may want to investigate when rememberers can trust experiences of high confidence 
remembering. 
6.4 Continued Questions and Future Directions 
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Although the four experiments reported in this dissertation are largely consistent, they do raise 
several important issues for future research. First, and as I have discussed previously (DeSoto, 
2011), the exact mechanism through which false alarms arise in the categorized list procedure 
remains in question. Dewhurst (2001) proposed a covert generation mechanism at encoding that 
leads to failures of source monitoring at study, but it stands to reason from that theory that such 
errors would result in high rates of false remembering, as opposed to higher rates of false 
knowing and guessing, as was discovered in this study. Rather, it appears that false alarms may 
arise due to semantic memory processes at test rather than generation at encoding, which is 
consistent with the account proposed by S. M. Smith et al. (2002). According to this account, the 
structure of categorized lists guides true and false recognition of category items. This account 
also meshes with the theorizing of Tulving (1985), who suggested that know responses reflect 
output from semantic memory. 
Another goal is better understanding the statements that each of the four types of confidence-
accuracy correlation make about the association between confidence and accuracy in studies. 
Although we have argued that these correlations need not agree, it is important to develop this 
statement and explore when these correlations agree and when they do not (as well as the relative 
frequencies of agreement and disagreement). It would also be worthwhile to determine which 
correlations are best for which purposes. For instance, sorting items by within-items gamma 
would allow ordering of items from the most deceptive to the least deceptive – this is easier done 
with within-items correlations than between-items correlations, for instance, because gamma 
provides a single index of deceptiveness. Although this was not done in the studies reported here, 
it is a potential analysis for follow-up research. It is likely that resolution for individual items 
would correlate well with response frequency. 
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A final and clearly quite important objective for future study is continued evaluation of the 
continuous dual-process model. The research presented here largely comes from the 
metacognition tradition, so it would be of benefit for researchers wielding traditional signal 
detection methods to also investigate the discrepancies reported here; the publications that have 
cited the continuous dual-process model generally have not been evaluative in nature. Perhaps 
use of other integrative models of signal detection (e.g., the two-stage dynamic signal detection 
model, which integrates decisions, response times, and confidence – but not 
remember/know/guess judgments – Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010) would assist.       
6.5 Epilogue: Confidence and Accuracy 
This line of research began with the central question: What is the relationship between 
confidence and accuracy? As a final perspective, I took the average confidence and accuracy for 
every subject who participated in Experiments 1 and 2 of DeSoto and Roediger (2014) and 
Experiments 2, 3, and 4 of this dissertation – 294 individuals in all. The average confidence and 
average accuracy scores of these 294 subjects are depicted in Figure 6.1. As the figure shows, the 
correlation between confidence and accuracy with subject as the unit of analysis is modestly 
positive, r = .47. A final word could be that confidence and accuracy are related. 
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Figure 6.1: The between-subjects old/new confidence-old/new accuracy correlation across all items in 
five experiments, N = 294. 
As my colleagues and I have shown, however, this relationship is more complex than it appears. 
Although a natural reaction to this complexity might be to toss out confidence ratings from 
classrooms, courtrooms, and laboratories entirely, confidence ratings are simple, intuitive metrics 
that indeed correlate with accuracy a great deal of the time. For the subjective feeling of 
confidence to be maximally useful, though, we must be better informed about when we can trust 
our feelings of confidence, whether strong or weak.  
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Pairing the remember/know/guess procedure with our prior work on the confidence-accuracy 
correlation sheds insight on how qualitative bases of memory (i.e., recollection vs. familiarity; 
remembering vs. knowing), when combined with confidence, are able to predict our accuracy. I 
have shown that although remembering is more often associated with accurate memories than 
knowing, it is also the case that remember responses show a stronger confidence-accuracy 
correlation than knows or guesses – a pattern that emerges for both old/new recognition but also 
source recognition. Thus, for the rememberer, being able to simulate episodically a prior event is 
more telling of a memory’s veridicality than thinking, “I just know I know it,” even when those 
episodic details are not relevant to the purpose of retrieval. 
 In sum, although most of the time our memories are relatively trustworthy, confidence in false 
memories can have negative consequences. These consequences range from awkward (thinking 
your new colleague’s name is Adam and not Andy) to embarrassing (mixing up the critical result 
of a study during a presentation) to terrible (putting an innocent person like Antonio Beaver in 
prison for a decade). Integrating remember/know/guess judgments into procedures using 
confidence ratings allows simultaneous investigation of the quantitative and qualitative processes 
supporting memory retrieval.  
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Appendix A 
Categorized List Materials 
 
Category items: 
 
In Experiments 2, 3, and 4, items from A Part of the Human Body and A Four-Legged Animal 
were not tested. 
 
• A Fish 
1. salmon 
2. trout 
3. goldfish 
4. catfish 
5. tuna 
6. shark 
7. flounder 
8. swordfish 
9. herring 
10. carp 
11. cod 
12. angelfish 
13. dolphin 
14. blowfish 
15. guppy 
16. halibut 
17. marlin 
18. minnow 
19. piranha 
20. snapper 
• An Insect 
1. fly 
2. ant 
3. spider 
4. bee 
5. mosquito 
6. beetle 
7. ladybug 
8. grasshopper 
9. butterfly 
10. wasp 
11. roach 
12. moth 
13. gnat 
14. caterpillar 
15. centipede 
16. cricket 
17. worm 
18. mantis 
19. dragonfly 
20. flea 
• A Vegetable 
1. carrot 
2. lettuce 
3. broccoli 
4. cucumber 
5. pea 
6. corn 
7. potato 
8. celery 
9. onion 
10. spinach 
11. squash 
12. bean 
13. cauliflower 
14. cabbage 
15. radish 
16. asparagus 
17. pepper 
18. beet 
19. turnip 
20. zucchini 
• A Musical Instrument 
1. drum 
2. guitar 
3. flute 
4. piano 
5. trumpet 
6. clarinet 
7. violin 
8. saxophone 
9. trombone 
10. tuba 
11. cello 
12. oboe 
13. viola 
14. harp 
15. keyboard 
16. piccolo 
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17. banjo 
18. harmonica 
19. cymbal 
20. tambourine 
• A Bird 
1. eagle 
2. robin 
3. bluejay 
4. cardinal 
5. hawk 
6. bluebird 
7. crow 
8. hummingbird 
9. parrot 
10. sparrow 
11. pigeon 
12. seagull 
13. dove 
14. parakeet 
15. falcon 
16. canary 
17. owl 
18. ostrich 
19. penguin 
20. raven 
• An Article of Clothing 
1. shirt 
2. pants 
3. sock 
4. underwear 
5. shoe 
6. hat 
7. shorts 
8. jacket 
9. sweater 
10. skirt 
11. jeans 
12. coat 
13. dress 
14. glove 
15. sweatshirt 
16. scarf 
17. blouse 
18. tie 
19. belt 
20. undershirt 
• A Weather Phenomenon 
1. tornado 
2. hurricane 
3. rain 
4. snow 
5. hail 
6. flood 
7. lightning 
8. blizzard 
9. earthquake 
10. sleet 
11. monsoon 
12. thunder 
13. tsunami 
14. wind 
15. storm 
16. typhoon 
17. drought 
18. cloud 
19. sunshine 
20. drizzle 
• A Sport 
1. football 
2. basketball 
3. soccer 
4. baseball 
5. tennis 
6. hockey 
7. swimming 
8. golf 
9. volleyball 
10. lacrosse 
11. track 
12. rugby 
13. softball 
14. skiing 
15. cheerleading 
16. running 
17. gymnastics 
18. polo 
19. racquetball 
20. wrestling 
• An Occupation or Profession 
1. doctor 
2. teacher 
3. lawyer 
4. nurse 
5. professor 
6. accountant 
7. psychologist 
8. dentist 
9. engineer 
10. secretary 
11. manager 
12. cook 
13. firefighter 
14. policeman 
15. athlete 
16. banker 
17. carpenter 
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18. janitor 
19. scientist 
20. student 
• A Fruit 
1. apple 
2. orange 
3. banana 
4. grape 
5. pear 
6. peach 
7. strawberry 
8. kiwi 
9. pineapple 
10. watermelon 
11. tomato 
12. plum 
13. grapefruit 
14. mango 
15. cherry 
16. lemon 
17. blueberry 
18. cantaloupe 
19. raspberry 
20. lime 
• A Part of the Human Body 
1. leg 
2. arm 
3. finger 
4. head 
5. toe 
6. eye 
7. hand 
8. nose 
9. ear 
10. foot 
11. mouth 
12. stomach 
13. heart 
14. knee 
15. neck 
16. brain 
17. hair 
18. elbow 
19. shoulder 
20. chest 
• A Four-Footed Animal 
1. dog 
2. cat 
3. horse 
4. lion 
5. bear 
6. tiger 
7. cow 
8. elephant 
9. deer 
10. mouse 
11. pig 
12. rat 
13. giraffe 
14. squirrel 
15. rabbit 
16. goat 
17. zebra 
18. moose 
19. sheep 
20. cheetah 
 
 
Unrelated lures: 
In Experiments 2, 3, and 4, the items in italics were not tested. 
• adjective 
• aluminum 
• amethyst 
• anaconda 
• aspen 
• axe 
• barge 
• battleship 
• bazooka 
• blender 
• brass 
• butter 
• cabin 
• cabinet 
• cave 
• cedar 
• chapel 
• cobra 
• coffee 
• conjunction 
• cousin 
• curry 
• daughter 
• day 
• decade 
• denim 
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• diamond 
• dogwood 
• essay 
• father 
• ferry 
• fleece 
• flyer 
• futon 
• garnet 
• gin 
• governor 
• grass 
• grenade 
• igloo 
• iris 
• island 
• kayak 
• ketchup 
• kilometer 
• ladle 
• lawnmower 
• lead 
• letter 
• level 
• lilac 
• liquor 
• magazine 
• mansion 
• mayor 
• micrometer 
• mile 
• milk 
• millimeter 
• minute 
• monastery 
• nail 
• nanosecond 
• nickel 
• niece 
• noun 
• nylon 
• oil 
• opal 
• ottoman 
• palm 
• pamphlet 
• petunia 
• pick 
• pitchfork 
• plow 
• preposition 
• president 
• pronoun 
• python 
• raft 
• rattlesnake 
• recliner 
• rifle 
• river 
• rock 
• rose 
• rum 
• sanctuary 
• sander 
• sapphire 
• screwdriver 
• senator 
• shovel 
• soda 
• sofa 
• son 
• spruce 
• stove 
• sugar 
• sword 
• synagogue 
• temple 
• tent 
• tongs 
• townhouse 
• treasurer 
• velvet 
• vinegar 
• violet 
• viper 
• vodka 
• week 
• whisk 
• whiskey 
• wine 
• wool 
• wrench 
• yard 
• zinc 
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Appendix B 
Remember/Know/Guess Instructions 
Remember/know/guess instructions presented on the computer screen in Experiment 1 to 
subjects in the visual presentation group and in Experiment 2: 
 
In this test you will see a series of words, one word at a time. Some of the words are those that you 
just saw. Others are not. For each word, click the OLD button if you recognize the word as one you 
saw earlier and click the NEW button if you do not think the word was one you saw earlier. 
 
Recognition memory is associated with two different kinds of awareness. Quite often recognition 
brings back to mind something you recollect about what it is that you recognize, as when, for 
example, you recognize someone’s face, and perhaps remember talking to this person at a party the 
previous night. At other times recognition brings nothing back to mind about what it is you 
recognize, as when, for example, you are confident that you recognize someone, and you know you 
recognize them, because of strong feelings of familiarity, but you have no recollection of seeing 
this person before. You do not remember anything about them. 
 
The same kinds of awareness are associated with recognizing the words you saw earlier. Sometimes 
when you recognize a word as one you saw earlier, recognition will bring back to mind something 
you remember thinking about when you saw the word. You recollect something you consciously 
experienced at that time. 
 
But sometimes recognizing a word as one you saw earlier will not bring back to mind anything you 
remember about seeing it then. Instead, the word will seem familiar, so that you feel confident it 
was one you saw earlier, even though you don’t recollect anything you experienced when you saw 
it then. 
 
For each word that you recognize, after you have clicked the OLD button, please then click the 
REMEMBER button, if recognition is accompanied by some recollective experience, or the KNOW 
button, if recognition is accompanied by strong feelings of familiarity in the absence of any 
recollective experience. 
 
There will also be times when you do not remember the word, nor does it seem familiar, but you 
might want to guess that it was one of the words you saw earlier. Feel free to do this, but if your 
OLD response is really just a guess, please then click the GUESS button. 
 
Remember/know/guess instructions read by the experimenter in Experiment 1 to subjects in 
the visual presentation group and in Experiment 2: 
 
You are going to take a test on the words you just learned. When you see these words on the test, if 
a word triggers something that you experienced when you saw it previously, like, for example, 
something about its appearance on the screen or the way it was spelled, or the order in which the 
word came in, I would like you to indicate this kind of recognition by clicking the REMEMBER 
button. 
 
In other instances the word may remind you of something you thought about when you saw it 
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previously, like an association that you made to the word, or an image that you formed when you 
saw the word, or something of personal significance that you associated with the word; again if you 
can recollect any of these aspects of when the word was first presented I would like you to click the 
REMEMBER button. 
 
Instead, at other times you will see a word and you will recognize it as one you saw earlier, but the 
word will not bring back to mind anything you remember about seeing it then, the word will just 
seem extremely familiar. When you feel confident that you saw the word earlier, even though you 
do not recollect anything you experienced when you aw it, I would like you to indicate this kind of 
recognition by clicking the KNOW button. 
 
With know responses you are sure about seeing the word earlier but cannot remember the 
circumstances in which the word was presented, or the thoughts elicited when the word was 
presented. With a guess response, you think it possible that you saw the word but you are not sure 
that you did. For some reason, you think there was a chance that you saw the word. Some people 
say ‘‘it looks like one of those words that I could have possibly seen.’’ When you think your 
response was really just a guess, I would like you to click the GUESS button. 
Trial prompts for Experiment 2: 
 
Is the word above OLD or NEW? 
How confident are you that the answer you just provided is correct? 
Do you REMEMBER, KNOW, or GUESS that the answer was OLD? 
Recognition instructions for Experiment 3: 
 
In this test you will see a series of words, one word at a time. Some of the words are those that you 
just read. Others are not. For each word, click the TOP LEFT button if you recognize the word as 
one you read in the top left of the screen, BOTTOM RIGHT if you saw it in the bottom right, and 
NEW button if you do not think the word was one you read earlier. 
 
You will then rate your confidence in your decision on a scale from 0 (not at all confident) to 100 
(entirely confident). 
 
When you say an item is OLD (by clicking TOP LEFT or BOTTOM RIGHT), you will also judge 
whether you REMEMBER, KNOW, or GUESS that the item is OLD. Next, we describe what those 
terms mean. 
 
Recognition memory is associated with two different kinds of awareness. Quite often recognition 
brings back to mind something you recollect about what it is that you recognize, as when, for 
example, you recognize someone’s face, and perhaps remember talking to this person at a party the 
previous night. At other times recognition brings nothing back to mind about what it is you 
recognize, as when, for example, you are confident that you recognize someone, and you know you 
recognize them, because of strong feelings of familiarity, but you have no recollection of seeing 
this person before. You do not remember anything about them. 
 
The same kinds of awareness are associated with recognizing the words you read earlier. 
Sometimes when you recognize a word as one you read earlier, recognition will bring back to mind 
something you remember thinking about when you read the word. You recollect something you 
consciously experienced at that time. 
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But sometimes recognizing a word as one you read earlier will not bring back to mind anything you 
remember about hearing it then. Instead, the word will seem familiar, so that you feel confident it 
was one you read earlier, even though you don’t recollect anything you experienced when you read 
it then. 
 
For each word that you recognize, please then click the REMEMBER button if recognition is 
accompanied by some recollective experience, or the KNOW button if recognition is accompanied 
by strong feelings of familiarity in the absence of any recollective experience. There will also be 
times when you do not remember the word, nor does it seem familiar, but you might want to guess 
that it was one of the words you read earlier. Feel free to do this, but if your response is really just a 
guess, please then click the GUESS button. 
 
Trial prompts for Experiment 3: 
 
 Was the word presented in the TOP LEFT, BOTTOM RIGHT, or NEW? 
 
 How confident are you that the answer you just provided is correct? 
 
 Do you REMEMBER, KNOW, or GUESS that the word was OLD? 
 
Study instructions for Experiment 4: 
 
You are going to be presented with 10 word lists, each containing words from a different category. 
You will first see the name of the category, then each word in the category. Please try your best to 
learn the words you read. 
 
The words will appear in different locations on the screen -- either in the top left of the screen, or 
the bottom right. Please try your best to remember the location in which word appears. 
After you have studied all the list items, you will be tested on your memory for each word   and 
your memory for the location on the screen in which each word was presented. You will not need to 
recall the category names. 
 
Old/new recognition and confidence instructions for Experiment 4: 
 
In this test you will see a series of words, one word at a time. Some of the words are those that you 
just read. Others are not. For each word, click the OLD button if you recognize the word as one you 
read earlier, and click the NEW button if you do not think the word was one you read earlier. 
You will then rate your confidence in your decision about whether the word was old or new on a 
scale from 0 (not at all confident) to 100 (entirely confident). 
 
Source instructions for Experiment 4: 
 
You will be asked to make additional decisions for words to which you responded OLD. For each 
word, click the TOP LEFT button if you recognize the word as one you read in the top left of the 
screen and BOTTOM RIGHT if you saw it in the bottom right. 
 
You will then rate your confidence in your decision about whether the word was in the top left or 
bottom right on a scale from 0 (not at all confident) to 100 (entirely confident). 
 
Remember/know/guess instructions for Experiment 4: 
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You will be asked to make additional decisions for words to which you responded OLD. For each 
word, judge whether you REMEMBER, KNOW, or GUESS that the item is OLD: 
Recognition memory is associated with two different kinds of awareness. Often, recognition brings 
back to mind something you recollect about what it is that you recognize, as when, for example, 
you recognize someone’s face, and perhaps remember talking to this person at a party the previous 
night. At other times recognition brings nothing back to mind about what it is you recognize, as 
when, for example, you know you recognize someone because of feelings of familiarity, but you 
have no recollection of seeing this person before. You do not remember anything about them. 
 
The same kinds of awareness are associated with recognizing the words you read earlier. 
Sometimes when you recognize a word as one you read earlier, recognition will bring back to mind 
something you remember thinking about when you read the word. You recollect something you 
consciously experienced at that time. 
 
But sometimes recognizing a word as one you read earlier will not bring back to mind anything you 
remember about hearing it then. Instead, the word will seem familiar, so that you feel it was one 
you read earlier, even though you don’t recollect anything you experienced when you read it then. 
 
Please click the REMEMBER button if recognition is accompanied by some recollective 
experience, or the KNOW button if recognition is accompanied by strong feelings of familiarity in 
the absence of any recollective experience. There will also be times when you do not remember the 
word but you guessed that it was one of the words you read earlier. If your response was really just 
a guess, click the GUESS button. 
 
Trial prompts for Experiment 4: 
 
 Is the word OLD or NEW? 
 
 Was the word presented in the TOP LEFT or BOTTOM RIGHT? 
 
How confident are you about your old/new decision? 
 
How confident are you about your top/bottom decision?  
 
Do you REMEMBER, KNOW, or GUESS that the word was old? 
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Appendix C 
Logistic Regression Analyses 
Experiment 1 
One additional way to examine the relationship between responding and accuracy is through 
logistic regression. Using logistic regression allows prediction of accuracy as a function of 
whether a remember, know, or guess was provided in conjunction with the recognition decision. 
Although these equations are trivial in the case of Experiment 1, I still present them for 
descriptive purposes and build off of them in the analyses for the subsequent experiments. 
 
The overall regression prediction equation is: 
 ln 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 !"##$!% = 2.50 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 + 1.00 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤 + 0(𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠)−    .48  
Thus, the logistic regression prediction equations for remember, know, and guess judgments are 
as follows: 
 ln(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠)!"##$!!!"#"#$"! = 2.02  
ln 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 !"##$!!!"#$ = .52  
ln(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠)!"##$!!!"#$$ = −.48  
To convert from log odds to the odds ratio, the antilog function is used. 
 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠!"##$!!!"#"#$"! = exp 2.02 = 7.54  
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠!"##$!!!"#$ = exp(.52) = 1.68  
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠!"##$!!!"#$$ = exp(−.48) = .62  
To get the predicted probability of a correct response, the odds are divided by 1 + the odds. 
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𝑝!"##$!!!"#"#$"! =    !.!"!.!" = .88  
𝑝!"##$!!!"#$ =    !.!"!.!" = .63  
𝑝!"##$!!!"#$$ =    .!"!.!" = .38   
Note that these probabilities align with the accuracy values presented in Figure 2.3, as expected. 
 
Experiment 2 
These are the logistic regression equations that predict accuracy as a function of confidence and 
remember/know/guess judgment in Experiment 2: 
 ln(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠)!"##$!!!"#"#$"! = −2.95+ .05(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)  
ln 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 !"##$!!!"#$ = −1.90+ .03(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)    
ln(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠)!"##$!!!"#$$ = −1.04+ .01(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)  
These equations show that the degree that confidence contributes to the log odds depends on 
whether the subject is remembering, knowing, or guessing – and indeed, this interaction is 
significant in the model, p < .001. Because the accuracy prediction varies as a function of 
confidence, however, point predictions are not possible. Instead, this relationship can be shown in 
the following figure. Note its similarity in appearance to Figure 3.4. 
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Figure C.1: Predicted accuracy (via logistic regression) as a function of remember, know, or guess 
judgment and confidence rating in Experiment 2.  
Experiment 3 
These are the logistic regression equations that predict old/new accuracy as a function of 
confidence and remember/know/guess judgment in Experiment 2: 
 ln(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠)!"##$!!!"#"#$"! = −1.38+ .04(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)  
ln(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠)!"##$!!!!"# = −.98+ .02(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)  
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ln(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠)!"##$!!!"#$$ = −.99+ .01(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)  
These equations are depicted in Figure C.2.  
 
Figure C.2: Predicted old/new accuracy as a function of remember, know, or guess judgment and 
confidence rating in Experiment 3. 
The prediction equations for source accuracy: 
 ln 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 !"##$!!!"#"#$"! = −2.45+ .04 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒   
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ln 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 !"##$!!!"#$ = −2.09+ .03 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒   
ln(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠)!"##$!!!"#$$ = −1.87+ .01(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)  
These equations are depicted in Figure C.3. Note the similarities in performance between 
remember and know judgments. 
 
 
Figure C.3: Predicted source accuracy as a function of remember, know, or guess judgment and confidence 
rating in Experiment 3.  
Overall, an inspection of these two sets of equations shows that they are quite similar, from a 
descriptive standpoint. Performance is lower for source accuracy than old/new accuracy – hence 
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the lower intercepts in the second set of equations – but the contribution of confidence to the odds 
remains approximately the same in all cases – for remember responses, confidence was a greater 
predictor of eventual accuracy than know, and know more than guess, for both old/new and source 
confidence. 
 
Experiment 4 
In Experiment 4, it was possible to construct logistic regression equations using 
remember/know/guess, old/new confidence, and source confidence as a predictor of both old/new 
and source accuracy. For the old/new accuracy prediction equations: 
 ln 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 !!""#$!!"#"#$"!!"#$%& = −2.79+    .03 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!"#$%& +    .02(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!"#$%&)  
ln 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 !"##$!!!"#$!"#$%&   = −2.56+    .04 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!"#$%& +    .01(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!"#$%&)  
ln 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 !"##$!!!"#$$!"#$%& = −1.45+    .02 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!"#$%&   
These cannot be graphed easily because they include two different variables as predictors. 
 
When predicting source accuracy, the following equations are obtained: 
 ln 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 !"##$!!!"#"#$"!!"#$%& = −3.78+    .03 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!"#$%& +    .03(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!"#$%&)  
ln 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 !"##$!!!"#$!"#$%&   = −3.71+    .03 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!"#$%& +    .02(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!"#$%&)  
ln 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 !"##$!!!"#$$!"#$%& = −2.13+    .01 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!"#$%&   
These equations appear very similar; the coefficients for old/new confidence and source 
confidence are approximately similar regardless of whether old/new accuracy or source accuracy 
is the outcome variable. In all these cases, however, the contribution of confidence is numerically 
greater in a state of remembering than knowing, and knowing than guessing. 
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Appendix D 
Confidence-Accuracy Correlation Tables for Experiment 4 
 
Table D.1: Old/new confidence-old/new accuracy correlations by group for the three item types in 
Experiment 4. Between-units correlations calculated using Pearson r, within-units correlations calculated 
with Goodman-Kruskal γ. *p < .05 **p < .01 
Between-Subjects Group A Group B Group C Group D 
Targets .19** -.66** .61** .62** 
Related Lures .27** -.01** .18** .20** 
Unrelated Lures .68** -.21** .54** .45** 
Between-Events     
Targets -.30** -.49** -.54** .49** 
Related Lures -.04** -.16** -.08** .00** 
Unrelated Lures -.48** -.12** -.15** .31** 
Within-Subjects     
Targets .60** -.64** .60** .59** 
Related Lures .09** -.05** .06** .08** 
Unrelated Lures .46** -.27** .28** .26** 
Within-Events     
Targets .51** -.62** .61** .65** 
Related Lures .11** -.05** .05** .03** 
Unrelated Lures .54** -.16** .30** .25** 
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Table D.2: Old/new confidence-old/new accuracy correlations by group for the three response types in 
Experiment 4. Between-units correlations calculated using Pearson r, within-units correlations calculated 
with Goodman-Kruskal γ. Due to counterbalancing, within-events correlations could not be calculated. *p 
< .05 **p < .01 
Between-Subjects Group A Group B Group C Group D 
Remember .72** .57** .83** .69** 
Know .56** .64** .81** .75** 
Guess .18** .20** .40** .31** 
Between-Events     
Remember .61** .59** .72** .64** 
Know .61** .49** .69** .64** 
Guess .49** .06** .30** .34** 
Within-Subjects     
Remember .41** .48** .54** .49** 
Know .62** .26** .48** .31** 
Guess .31** .16** .21** .18** 
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Table D.3: Source confidence-source accuracy correlations by group for the three response types in 
Experiment 4. Between-units correlations calculated using Pearson r, within-units correlations calculated 
with Goodman-Kruskal γ. Due to counterbalancing, within-events correlations could not be calculated.  *p 
< .05 **p < .01 
Between-Subjects Group A Group B Group C Group D 
Remember .77** .83** .69** .78** 
Know .57** .69** .52** .66** 
Guess .00** .08** .12** .52** 
Between-Events     
Remember .73** -.75** .61** .72** 
Know .45** -.29** .46** .61** 
Guess .37** -.01** .03** .13** 
Within-Subjects     
Remember .34** .43** .26** -.48** 
Know .30** .19** .25** -.30** 
Guess .13** .03** .12** -.04** 
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